

Institution: Brunel University London		
Unit of Assessment: 19 Politics and International Studies		
Title of case study: Intelligence Doctrine by Stealth: Developing Professional Practice in Intelligence Analysis for the European Union		
Period when the underpinning research was undertaken: 2002 - 2013		
Details of staff conducting the underpinning research from the submitting unit:		
Name(s):	Role(s) (e.g. job title):	Period(s) employed by submitting HEI:
Professor Philip H.J. Davies;	Professor – Intelligence Studies / Director, Brunel Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies	09/2003 - present
Dr Kristian C. Gustafson	Reader - Intelligence Studies	03/2007 - present
Period when the claimed impact occurred: 2014 - 2020		
Is this case study continued from a case study submitted in 2014? N		

1. Summary of the impact (indicative maximum 100 words)

Prof. Davies and Dr Gustafson were commissioned by the European Union's (EU) Intelligence and Situation Centre (INTCEN) to design an annual training programme for analysts in order to create a body of professional practice that would serve as an INTCEN internal intelligence doctrine. The aim was to provide a suite of common operating standards and methods shared by INTCEN, the EU Military Staff (MS) Intelligence (Int) Directorate, and the EU Satellite Centre, for personnel from 89 intelligence and policy organisations across the EU. Following the adoption of Prof. Davies' and Dr Gustafson's research, INTCEN significantly improved the quality and impact of intelligence products and successfully provided a suite of common concepts for the 3 agencies. This resulted in improved working between INTCEN and EU MS Int analysts and promotion of common intelligence analytic standards and practices across the EU.

2. Underpinning research (indicative maximum 500 words)Key Themes

The Brunel Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies (BCISS) is a hub for political- and policy-focused research into intelligence and security organisations. This work addresses a range of persistent and significant problems affecting the intelligence as a core function of government including:

The Problem of Analysis – Intelligence is commonly understood to mean information collected on targets actively seeking to conceal their capabilities and intentions. Information so acquired is, therefore, rarely comprehensive and subject to significant challenges in terms of truthfulness, accuracy and relevance. Consequently, there is a premium on interpreting, collating and fusing those sources as effectively as possible. This phase of *analysis and assessment* is the most likely aspect of the intelligence process to fail (see, e.g. **Ref 6**). Both Prof. Davies, then Senior Lecturer (**Ref 1, Ref 2, Ref 3; Grant 1, Grant 4, Grant 5, Grant 6**), and Dr Gustafson, then Lecturer (**Ref 4**), have examined challenges arising from organisational structure to managing effective intelligence community functions including analysis.

The Problem of Culture and Intelligence – Prof. Davies and Dr Gustafson, (**Ref 3, Ref 6; Grant 1, Grant 2**), have examined the significance of differing national and organisational professional cultures in intelligence ('intelligence culture') as both challenges to and facilitators of managing the intelligence process.

The Problem of Professionalisation – While intelligence cultures may vary there are significant common functional exigencies in the collection and assessment of intelligence. Regardless of national or institutional cultural variation, many if not most intelligence organisations in both the government and private sectors have increasingly found it necessary to articulate systematic professional standards of intelligence analysis and wider intelligence professional practice (**Ref 4, Ref 6; Grant 2**).

The 'Rest of the World' Problem – Most intelligence scholarship is concerned with the Anglo-American developed states. Prof. Davies and Dr Gustafson have pursued an on-going effort to understand intelligence outside the 'Anglosphere' engaging with the non-Anglophone developed world, the 'global south', and authoritarian as well as democratic systems of government (**Ref 5; Grant 1, Grant 5**).

Key Findings:

- F 1. The intelligence function in most governments deals with a common range of functional tasks and imperatives. However, these tasks and imperatives are often implemented in very different ways due to national variations in political and organisational culture (**Ref 1, Ref 2, Ref 3, Ref 5, Ref 6; Grant 1, Grant 3, Grant 4, Grant 5, Grant 6**).
- F 2. Basic intelligence concepts and practices can also vary as much *within* national governments as between them. That variation typically aligns with differences in corporate culture and functional task between agencies and services. (**Ref 3, Ref 6; Grant 1, Grant 3, Grant 4, Grant 5, Grant 6**). As a result, variations in institutional intelligence culture can result in joint working difficulties as practitioners from different agencies work to differing basic concepts and conventions (**Ref 3, Ref 6; Grant 1, Grant 3, Grant 5, Grant 6**).
- F 3. A significant international trend has been the 'professionalisation' of intelligence and intelligence analysis in general, largely shaped by US intelligence community developments in analytic methods, skills and procedures or 'analytic tradecraft' (**Ref 3, Ref 4, Ref 6; Grant 1, Grant 2, Grant 3**); however, the rate, degree and form in which analytic professionalisation has taken root in different countries has been fundamentally shaped by cultural as well as institutional factors (**Ref 3, Ref 5, Ref 6; Grant 3, Grant 5**).

3. References to the research (indicative maximum of six references)

Key Outputs:

Ref 1. Philip H.J. Davies. Collection and Assessment on Iraq: a Critical Review of Britain's Spy Machinery. *Studies in Intelligence* 49:4 (50th Anniversary Edition; Fall 2005), pp 41-54.
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol49no4/Spy_Machinery_4.htm

Ref 2. Philip H.J. Davies. Intelligence and the Machinery of Government: Conceptualising the Intelligence Community. *Public Policy and Administration* 25:1 (January 2010) pp.29-46.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0952076709347073>

Impact case study (REF3)

Ref 3. Philip H.J. Davies. *Intelligence and Government in Britain and the United States* (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International, 2012). Book monograph, 2 vols. ISBN 978-0-275-97572-2.

Ref 4. Kristian C. Gustafson. Strategic Horizons: Futures Forecasting and the British Intelligence Community. *Intelligence and National Security* 25, no. 5 (Oct. 2010): 589-610. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2010.537118>

Ref 5. Philip H.J. Davies & Kristian C. Gustafson. *Intelligence Elsewhere: Spies and Espionage Outside the Anglosphere*. (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013). ISBN: 9781589019560.

Ref 6. Philip H.J. Davies & Kristian Gustafson. Intelligence and Military Doctrine: Paradox or Oxymoron? *Defence Studies* Vol.19 No.1 (January 2019). <https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2018.1538698>

Relevant External Funding:

Grant 1. 2011 - 2014 – PHJ Davies (PI). BCISS Research Seminar Series Grant 'Emerging Issues in 21st Century Intelligence' from Raytheon UK (matching existing internal grant from Brunel). Funds awarded: AY 2011-12 GBP2,500. Renewed 2013-14 GBP3,500.

Grant 2. 2010 - 2011 – PHJ Davies (PI) & KC Gustafson (CI). Competitive Intelligence in Trade and Export (CITEX), Principal investigator leading BCISS role in consortium under EU Leonardo da Vinci Lifelong Learning (no. 2189 – 2009/504146). Total Grant Value: EUR316,970 (c. GBP265,500); Brunel Component: EUR37,643 (c. GBP31,844.50).

Grant 3. 2010-2012 – PHJ Davies (PI) & KC Gustafson (PI). Partnership with Ministry of Defence (via Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre and Defence Intelligence) to produce new edition of Joint Intelligence Doctrine. Contract value: GBP17, 625.00.

Grant 4. 2008 – 2010 – K.C. Gustafson (PI). British Academy 'Covert action, the CIA-DoD Divide'. Awarded: GBP6,350

Grant 5. 2008 - 2010 – PHJ Davies (PI). ESRC Seminar Series Grant: 'Intelligence and Government in the 21st Century'; co-applicant Dr Robert Dover (then at Loughborough), Department of Politics, University of Loughborough. Awarded GBP16,623.

Grant 6. 2004 – 2005: PHJ Davies (PI). Leverhulme Research Fellowship on 'Comparative Analysis of Intelligence in the UK and USA'. Awarded GBP13,676.

4. Details of the impact (indicative maximum 750 words)

Intelligence Analysis and the EU. Cross-cultural challenges to effective intelligence analysis have proven a significant difficulty for efforts to establish effective EU strategic intelligence support to the European External Action Service (EEAS) and EU MS delivered by INTCEN and EU MS Int respectively. Staffed by analysts typically on 4-year rotations from the EU's member states' intelligence services, ministries of foreign affairs and central EU institutions. Seconded intelligence professionals alone come from 89 very different national and military intelligence and security agencies (**S5.1**).

Consequently, INTCEN officials found secondees to INTCEN 'had been trained according to different standards ... [or] ... had no training at all' and most had 'limited or no experience at strategic level' and weak understanding of the intelligence-policy relationship (**S5.2, S5.3, S5.5**).

Impact case study (REF3)

Furthermore, INTCEN had ‘no applicable (or generally accepted) intelligence analysis doctrine’ and ‘in the highly consensual environment of EU institutions’ requiring buy-in from representatives of all 28 member states ‘there was little hope to agree a workable intelligence doctrine.’ The solution adopted by INTCEN managers was an ‘indirect approach’ in which ‘standards taught to new analysts would ... become a sort of informal analytical doctrine for INTCEN’ (**S5.2**) that would draw eclectically on global experience and practices (**S5.3**). Prof. Davies and Dr Gustafson were commissioned to develop a detailed specification for the programme, as well as design and deliver it.

The Brussels-Brunel Partnership. In a highly unusual move, INTCEN opted for an independent but still European provider for the new training package instead of the intelligence training facilities of one of the member states. According to then-Head of INTCEN Analysis Division (ANDIV), because the EU ‘is based on the balance of forces between MS [member states], an academic team (even if based in the UK) would probably be perceived as more neutral than the training school of any of the [national] agencies’ (**S5.3, S5.4**). Reflecting the existing reputation and impact of Prof. Davies’ and Dr Gustafson’s research, key figures in INTCEN were already familiar with relevant BCISS scholarship on national intelligence cultures and the team’s findings on the cultural challenges to intelligence analysis (**S5.2**), as well as their work on the UK’s military Joint Intelligence Doctrine (**S5.2; S5.3**). BCISS were tasked with designing as well as delivering the proposed ‘informal doctrine’. The resulting INTCEN programme has drawn explicitly on Prof. Davies’ and Dr Gustafson’s work covering:

1. The comparative findings regarding the relationship between common intelligence functions and differing national intelligence institutions and cultures (**Ref 3, Ref 5; F 1, F3**) to provide relevance to a multi-national, multi-cultural and largely non-Anglosphere cohort of analysts (**S5.3, S5.5**).
2. Transatlantic comparative analysis (**Ref 1, Ref 2, Ref 3, Ref 5; F1, F2**) to capture and communicate key features of American ‘analytical tradecraft’ (**S5.2**) and British strategic intelligence analytic working practices that INTCEN wish to emulate (**S5.5**).
3. Their experience in developing and articulating intelligence professional practice to identify and capture specific techniques and working practices (**Ref 6; Grant 2; F 3**) to form the basis of an INTCEN ‘informal doctrine’ (**S5.2, S5.3**).

After the leadership change in 2015, the new Director and Head of Analysis Division chose to continue the BCISS partnership (**S5.5**), despite the June 2016 Brexit vote and in 2019 even after the UK’s formal departure from the EU (**S5.5**). Indeed, in 2017 the Brunel course was placed at the heart of a wider INTCEN ‘induction package’ (**S5.5**). The programme ran annually between 2013 and 2019. In July 2020, the new Director and Head of Analysis Division stated, ‘the very fact that EU INTCEN has systematically renewed the contract since 2013 and has extended the audience is a testimony of the good results achieved by the combined efforts of the two trainers, mixing smoothly theoretical and practical approaches’ (**S5.5**).

He has also noted the value of the BCISS course in ‘contributing to the strengthening of the ... Assessment Staff’s corporate identity’ (**S5.5**). Moreover, the 2016 and 2017 iterations of the course ‘were pivotal in helping EU INTCEN’s new management to bolster reactivity and to change from a largely “academic” drafting culture to a more impact-oriented and timely type of products’ intended to improve the impact of INTCEN products with EU policy officials. Moreover,

with more than half of the INTCEN analytic workforce having taken the course ‘we could see extremely positive changes in drafting patterns, be it in conciseness and timeliness on one side but also in terms of presentation and argumentation on the other’ (**S5.5**).

EU Impact Beyond INTCEN. The INTCEN programme was delivered annually from 2013-2019 and was not merely directed at new INTCEN analysts. From the outset, the intent was to use the INTCEN ‘informal doctrine’ to improve cooperation between typically civilian INTCEN analysts and those with military backgrounds at the EU Military Staff Intelligence Directorate (EU MS Int) (**S5.5**). Consequently, attendees on the course were drawn from the EU Satellite Centre (SATCEN) and policy officials from within EEAS. According to the Director and Head of Analysis Division ‘In only one week’ each year on the BCISS course ‘extremely useful common ground is built up and the good spirit prevailing in the course helps building bridges between analysts’ from both INTCEN and EU MS Int (**S5.5**). Moreover, involving policy as well as intelligence officials has helped compensate for ‘the very limited intelligence and security culture of most EU officials’ and users of INTCEN appreciations ‘have benefited from Brunel expertise’ (**S5.5**).

Approximately 20 INTCEN staff participated in the programme each year, resulting in approximately 120 personnel receiving training, most of them from INTCEN and EU MS with smaller proportions coming from SATCEN and EU policy departments. The programme, therefore, served to establish common operating concepts and standards across a range of EU intelligence and policy organisations.

An additional goal was to diffuse impact across the EU by exporting the concepts, practices and standards encapsulated in the INTCEN-BCISS programme to the national intelligence communities of the EU member states. According to the previous Head of Analysis Division, European federalists have advocated closer integration and common operating standards across member states’ intelligence organisations (**S5.3**). Since ‘almost 30 European intelligence services have seconded analysts to EU INTCEN,’ the previous Head of Analysis Division expects that ‘INTCEN’s analytical and training experience may be having a certain influence on what some European countries are doing or planning to do in the field of training’ (**S5.3**). Although he has acknowledged that evaluating any such broader change is difficult (**S5.4**), the BCISS contribution here is the development of that body of common professional practice that EU officials hope to export to member states.

5. Sources to corroborate the impact (indicative maximum of 10 references)

- S5.1.** Letter from Director, EU INTCEN, 23 September 2013
- S5.2.** Email from former Head of Analysis Division, EU INTCEN, 26 December 2015
- S5.3.** Intelligence Analysis Training: A European Perspective, 9 May 2016,
<https://doi.org/10.1080/23800992.2016.1150684>
- S5.4.** Email from former Head of Analysis Division, EU INTCEN, 17 July 2020
- S5.5.** Letter from Head of Analysis Division, EU INTCEN, 20 July 2020