Impact case study database

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Between 2015 and 2020, DeVore’s research findings have enhanced national security in democracies by improving military preparedness and weapons acquisition programmes. Specifically, DeVore’s research on how the accelerating pace of technological innovation poses deep challenges to both military organizations and domestic defense industries has:

• Provoked an intense debate over the vulnerabilities and deficiencies of U.S. airborne forces, leading to reform initiatives to improve their mobility and firepower. These ultimately resulted in the 2018 creation of a light armored company within the 82nd Airborne Division equipped with parachutable wheeled armored vehicles and a programme to develop airborne tanks, launched in 2019—reflecting an investment of over USD26,000,000 in restoring and improving capabilities absent for over three decades.

• Led the Korean KF-X fighter jet programme to adopt a more collaborative approach with an increased number of international partners—to benefit from economies of scale, shared research and development costs, and technology transfers—while still protecting domestic strengths in electronics and flight control software. These changes have greatly ameliorated the risks of unexpected cost escalations while enhancing the likelihood of producing a functional combat aircraft that is globally price competitive.

1. Reforming U.S. Airborne Forces

DeVore’s research findings on the vulnerabilities and deficiencies of U.S. Airborne Forces, stemming from their organizational resistance to change, sparked an intense debate within the U.S. Army which ultimately led to concrete reforms—improving the mobility and firepower of paratroop units. The Army Times, widely subscribed to and read by army personnel, published an extended exposé and in-print debate on the future of U.S. airborne forces, based on the findings of When Failure Thrives [R1], with several leading decision-makers within the army agreeing with DeVore’s findings, including a retired Colonel, retired General, and a senior analyst with the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments [S1, p.3-4, 9]. The Army Press deputy director notes that DeVore’s study “ stirred considerable controversy within the U.S. Army. Staff researchers for the U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee contacted me to ask further questions about the monograph which they had used to deepen their understanding of Army capabilities and prepare their members for policy discussions… Even those advocates of Airborne forces who disagreed with DeVore’s message took away from his work the key insight that paratroopers must proactively work to reform themselves” [S2].

These debates then catalysed a reassessment of U.S. airborne forces and proposals for their reform and modernization. For example, analysts with RAND (an important U.S. defence think tank), cited DeVore’s findings on the unrealistically large size of airborne units, their extreme vulnerability to enemy fire, and their lack of ground mobility (i.e. vehicles) [S3, p.1-2, 7]. They then proposed re-envisioning the role of airborne forces around small-scale missions such as combatting terrorism and evacuating foreign nationals during emergencies, while also equipping paratrooper units with armoured vehicles and light armour [S3, p.4-5, 7-8]. Similarly, the Military Review published a proposal that would overcome these same deficiencies by reorganizing airborne assault capabilities around small reconnaissance squadrons equipped with light armoured vehicles [S4, p.93-94].

The U.S. Army ultimately embraced some of these proposed reforms, congruent with DeVore’s research findings that airborne forces lacked adequate firepower and mobility, while being overly vulnerable to artillery [R1]. “ The Army has, in the years since the publication of DeVore’s monograph, sought to rectify airborne forces’ shortcomings. Perhaps most impressive has been the Army’s efforts to address the lack of tank and anti-tank capabilities that DeVore had criticized.” [S2] In 2018, the Army created a light armoured company within the 82nd Airborne Division, equipped with parachutable wheeled armoured vehicles—an investment of over USD26,000,000 in vehicle procurement alone [S5]. As the Director of the US Army Combat Studies Institute attests, “recent developments in the force structure of the US Army’s airborne forces indicate that thinking officers took some of [DeVore’s] arguments to heart… two of the US Army’s five airborne brigades incorporated ‘Stryker’ light armored vehicles to their organic arsenals. The Stryker… will add a completely new dimension of protection to airborne forces, mitigating the historically vulnerable infantry forces’ greatest weakness” [S6]. In 2019, the Army then embarked on a project to develop airborne tanks to provide even greater firepower and mobility to its airborne units [S5]. “The US Army’s Combat Capabilities Development Command continues to refine its search for a light-weight air-droppable tank to accompany parachute forces on a forced-entry mission” [S6]. These initiatives represent the first time that U.S. airborne forces would have armoured vehicle capabilities since the 1990s, when the last of their tanks were retired from service, and the first new research and development on airborne tanks since the 1960s.

1. Shaping Technology Acquisition in South Korea’s Air Force

DeVore’s research findings on balancing domestic arms production with international collaborations—particularly leveraging global partnerships to overcome high research and development costs and create economies of scale while cultivating domestic production strengths [R2, R4-R6]—has shaped how South Korea’s government has pursued its K-FX fighter jet programme. Combat aircraft are one of the most sophisticated weapons systems to produce, with many expensive and technologically advanced sub-component systems that are difficult for states to develop comprehensively on their own. Historically, over 75% of combat aircraft development initiatives have failed to produce a functional aircraft that is globally price competitive. Only six successful programmes currently exist. Despite these odds, the South Korean Air Force initially launched its estimated USD16,000,000,000 fighter jet programme—the largest armaments project ever undertaken in South Korea—with high ambitions for self-sufficiency and only one partner, Indonesia.

DeVore was initially invited to share his research during the 2015 National Air Power Conference by two concerned Korean academics, who in 2017 became the National Security Advisor and Vice-Foreign Minister to the newly elected Korean government. This launched a period of sustained engagement where DeVore routinely participated in dialogues with Korean policymakers and Air Force officers on the difficulties of developing an indigenous fighter jet programme, including three additional National Air Power Conferences and seminars/workshops with government funded think tanks such as the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis, the Sejong Institute, the Institute for National Security Studies, and the East Asia Foundation [S7, S8]. DeVore was further granted a consulting contract on aerospace development with South Korea’s Agency for Defense Development, beginning in 2016 and still ongoing [S9].

Through these engagements, DeVore’s research findings reshaped the KF-X fighter project in key ways. Consistent with the importance of sharing costs and creating economies of scale [R4, R5], Korea has begun actively pursuing many more global partnerships, either as full co-developers or to provide difficult sub-components. As the Project Head for Korea’s Aerospace Technology Transfer Programme at South Korea’s Agency for Defense Development attests, “ Devore's research on leveraging global partnerships to overcome high research and development costs emphasized to us the importance of expanding our set of partners and obtaining high cost sub-systems from them” [S10]. The South Korean National Security Advisor elaborates that, “ Our government has thus gone to great lengths to preserve its co-development partnership with Indonesia when that later country’s financial problems led it to question whether to continue the project. We have also sought new partners, unsuccessfully negotiating a co-development partnership with Turkey and more successfully seeking focused technological arrangements with Israel and India” [S11]. At the same time, to protect existing strengths and comparative advantages [R2], Korea will focus on domestically developing important aspects of the flight control software and electronic systems. Indeed, the agreement with Israel also provides for technology transfer so that Korea can eventually develop their own expertise in aerospace radar. According to the First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, “ Dr. DeVore’s emphasis on the need for an activist state to overcome technological bottlenecks encouraged our Agency for Defense Development to proactively ‘target’ key technologies for either domestic development or acquisition through international partnerships” [S12]. The Project Head for Korea’s Aerospace Technology Transfer Programme further attests that “ these changes— more international partnerships, globalizing our supply chain, and seeking out technology transfers— are mitigating the risks of unexpected cost escalations and increasing the likelihood of the project becoming a success” [S10].