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- Is this case study continued from a case study submitted in 2014?
- No
1. Summary of the impact
Research by Jan Selby and collaborators on issues of water and climate security has critiqued dominant narratives and advanced alternative analytical and policy frameworks at a range of sites and scales. This case study documents the impacts of this research in five specific issue areas: (1) the Israeli-Palestinian Joint Water Committee; (2) the role of climate change in the Syrian civil war; (3) challenging a UN study of Middle East waters; (4) supporting the transformation of the Palestinian water sector; and (5) the global security implications of water scarcities and climate change. Across these domains, the research has: enriched public and policy understandings; generated debate, critique and dissent; contributed to holding governments and international organisations to account; prompted policy changes and institutional reforms; affected international aid and negotiation priorities; and influenced patterns of water infrastructure development and water supply.
2. Underpinning research
Most research on water and climate security issues is Malthusian in orientation, viewing over-population and natural resource scarcities as the key drivers of environment-related conflicts and insecurities; and most of it is also aligned with the interests of the powerful, whether powerful individual states, or Northern actors and institutions. Jan Selby and colleagues’ political ecology-informed research confronts both of these tendencies. It contests dominant Malthusian narratives, in particular by revealing the fundamentally political causes and character of water and climate-related conflicts and insecurities. It seeks to analyse and expose patterns of water and climate-related domination. And it advances alternative – and explicitly political – frameworks for understanding and responding to water and climate security crises.
This case study focuses on five specific areas of this overall research programme:
(1) The Israeli-Palestinian Joint Water Committee (JWC), established in 1995 under the Oslo peace process, was initially lauded as a rational means of managing a scarce resource. Research by Selby, however, showed that the JWC was functioning as a mechanism of Israeli domination – that Israel was using it to limit Palestinian water development; that Israel was also conditioning its approval of Palestinian water development projects on simultaneous Palestinian Authority (PA) approval of new water systems for Jewish West Bank settlements; and that the PA, with the full knowledge of Presidents Abbas and Arafat, had approved every single Israeli application for water facilities for settlements, despite these settlements and associated infrastructures being illegal under international law and a key obstacle to Palestinian statehood. The latter finding constituted the first published evidence, in any sphere, of the PA formally consenting to parts of Israel’s illegal settlement expansion programme. Selby’s research both documented this and suggested how the PA might respond [3.1].
(2) By 2015, the thesis that climate change-induced migration in Syria had been a decisive spark for the country’s civil war had become paradigmatic to Malthusian climate security discourse, and a global policy and media orthodoxy. Research by Selby and colleagues, however, found this thesis to be without merit – including that there was no robust evidence of ‘climate migrants’ contributing to civil war onset in Syria; that north-east Syria’s pre-civil war ecological crisis was essentially political rather than climatic in its causes; and that the standard ‘climate conflict’ narrative was largely a product of Assad regime and donor interests in blaming the climate for this politically-induced crisis [e.g. 3.2].
Selby has also (3) analysed and critiqued a high-profile UN study of Middle East water issues for its pro-Israeli and anti-Arab biases [3.3]; has (4) made various proposals for the transformation of the Palestinian water sector [e.g. 3.4]; and at a more general level has (5) sought to rethink and advance new frameworks for understanding the global security implications of water scarcities and climate change – doing this by critiquing Malthusian orthodoxies, by analysing the interests behind them, by drawing attention instead to the political and economic causes of water and climate insecurities, and by highlighting the profound security implications of climate change adaptation and mitigation [3.5, 3.6].
3. References to the research
[3.1] Selby, J. ‘Cooperation, domination and colonisation: the Israeli-Palestinian Joint Water Committee’, Water Alternatives, Vol. 6, No. 1 (2013), pp. 1-24 ISSN 1965-0175 http://www.water-alternatives.org/index.php/volume6/v6issue1/196-a6-1-1 [text removed for publication].
[3.2] Selby, J., Dahi, O., Fröhlich, C., & Hulme, M. ‘Climate change and the Syrian civil war revisited’, Political Geography, Vol. 60 (2017), pp. 232-44 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2017.08.001 This article is the subject of a special section of the journal, published together with three commentaries plus a rejoinder.
[3.3] Messerschmid, C., & Selby, J. ‘Misrepresenting the Jordan River basin’, Water Alternatives, Vol. 8, No. 2 (2015), pp. 258-79 ISSN 1965-0175 http://www.water-alternatives.org/index.php/alldoc/articles/vol8/v8issue2/290-a8-2-13
[3.4] [text removed for publication]
[3.5] Selby, J., & Hoffmann, C. ‘Rethinking climate change, conflict and security’, Introduction to special issue of Geopolitics, Vol. 19, No. 4 (2014), pp. 747-56 https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2014.964866
[3.6] Selby, J. ‘The Trump presidency, climate change, and the prospect of a disorderly energy transition’, Review of International Studies, Vol. 45, No. 3 (2019), pp. 471-90 https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210518000165
4. Details of the impact
**
This research has had impacts in each of the above five areas. It should be noted that, given the intensely political nature of the research, impacts have inevitably been shaped by political interests and circumstances, [text removed for publication].
(1) The Israeli-Palestinian JWC: By way of historical context: Informed by Selby’s research [3.1], in 2010 the Palestinian Water Authority (PWA) changed its policy for water negotiations with Israel, deciding that it would henceforth veto all Israeli proposals for settlement water infrastructures put before the JWC. Israel retaliated against this shift in Palestinian policy by vetoing all Palestinian proposals for new water infrastructures within the West Bank, such that the JWC became deadlocked and stopped meeting. The publication of Selby’s finding that the PA had long been approving settlement infrastructures also led to extensive and heated public debate, especially within the Palestinian water sector, as detailed in a REF 2014 case study.
New impacts in the current REF cycle have included: firstly, continued public and policy awareness and debate around the issues raised by the research, as indicated inter alia by: local media coverage of Selby’s findings which first exposed the violation of international law in any sphere (for example in Ha’aretz which has up to 100,000 readers and the Jerusalem Post which has a circulation of 50,000) [5.1a,i]; discussion of them in reports by international organisations and leading Palestinian NGOs [5.2a-c]; reference to Selby’s research on the JWC by, for instance, Middle East Quartet Representative Tony Blair and UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Hilal Elver [5.1c,e]; international media coverage of a 2014-15 dispute about water supply for the new Palestinian city of Rawabi (which centred on the role of the JWC, and on which Selby provided multiple briefings including text used in a BBC documentary by Lisa Doucet) [5.1b,d]; including coverage in Newsweek magazine which reaches 100 million a week [5.1f], and evidence from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) [5.4.a] that Selby’s findings were read by and circulated amongst consular officials. As [text removed for publication] [5.3a] testifies: Selby’s research ‘ exposed the JWC as an instrument of Israeli domination and colonisation, including showing that Israel had over many years been successfully blackmailing the PWA to approve illegal settlement facilities… As a result, the JWC is still today widely viewed as illegitimate and unjust’. He further notes, ‘ This research was widely circulated and discussed within the Palestinian water sector, and with international donors, and led to heated debate’ with the effect that ‘ the extensive public dissemination and discussion of the research, and the issues raised by it, delegitimised the JWC within the PWA and amongst Palestinian water experts and international donors’.
Secondly, impacts on PWA negotiation policy: The 2010 change in PWA policy outlined above – a change which was informed by Selby’s research – continues to this day; since then, the PWA has not approved any new settlement water facilities. However, the JWC resumed its work in 2017 after the PWA, fearful of the incoming Trump administration, agreed revised committee terms giving Israel carte blanche to expand water supply to settlements without PWA approval (Selby’s published commentary on this development [5.1h] was circulated widely among Palestinian experts and donors). As noted by [text removed for publication], the JWC ‘ continues to be a source of dispute between Israeli and Palestinian water officials, and within the Palestinian water sector – with these disputes still centring on issues made public by Selby’ [5.3a]. [text removed for publication]
(2) Climate change and the Syrian civil war: Selby et al.’s research on this issue generated significant international public and policy interest and debate, as evidenced by: extensive direct media reporting of the research findings across media such as the BBC World Service, The Times, Daily Mail, Sputnik and USA Today; reproduction of a media commentary by Selby et al. in India’s second largest circulation English language newspaper, The Hindu (circulation 1.5 million); media approaches to contribute to related stories (e.g. stories in Asia Times and Syria Direct) [5.1j-r]; wide readership of the research, including by policymakers (3.2 is open access and has been Political Geography’s most downloaded article ever since publication) [5.6]; citations in policy and think tank reports (e.g. by the UN Food and Agricultural Organisation and US Army War College) [5.2f,g]; published critical responses to Selby’s research [3.2] from the leading global think tanks working on climate security (e.g. Adelphi and the Center for Climate and Security [5.2i,j]); and presentations to policy audiences (e.g. to the European Commission [5.9a]). While politicians and activists still periodically invoke the Syria case as part of their climate advocacy, Selby’s research [3.2] refuted the link and led policy actors to be much more cautious in talking about it and in ‘securitising’ climate change more generally [e.g. 5.8].
(3) UN-ESCWA on the Jordan River basin: Selby and colleagues’ analysis of a high profile UN-Economic and Social Commission for West Asia (UN-ESCWA) study of the Jordan basin [3.3] found that the study, despite having been produced by an organisation of Arab states with a record of opposition to the Israeli occupation, reproduced pro-Israeli misrepresentations of the basin’s political geography, hydrology and development; on this basis the authors called for the study’s retraction. [text removed for publication].
(4) Supporting the transformation of the Palestinian water sector: In addition to the critically-oriented research and impacts above, Selby has also developed a series of proposals and frameworks for the positive transformation of the Palestinian water sector. [text removed for publication]
(5) Global water and climate security: Selby has been an important voice in: arguing for more nuanced understandings of the security implications of water scarcity and climate change; calling for activists and policymakers not to overstate the threats of ‘water wars’ and ‘climate conflict’ for political purposes; emphasising the significant security implications of climate change adaptation and mitigation; and arguing that policy priorities and frameworks should reflect this [3.2 and 3.5]. There remain strong policy interests in ‘securitising’ climate change which are largely impervious to scientific findings. Nonetheless, evidence of Selby’s impact is provided by: regular input to media stories on water and climate security [5.1s-v]; citation in government and think tank reports (e.g. the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Clingendael Institute) [5.2k,l]; invited presentations and keynote addresses to policy and military audiences (inc. the FCO, Department for International Development (DfID), UK Conflict, Stability and Security Fund, Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA), and NATO Defence College) [5.9b-g]; private policy briefings [text removed for publication]; and regular informal briefings (esp. to FCO and DFID staff). As evidenced by testimonies, Selby’s research has, for instance, helped the Dutch government [5.11] to ‘ nuance our theories of change’ on water, climate change and security, and has ‘ influenced project design’ of the Water Peace and Security Partnership and ‘ speeches on the subject by Dutch politicians and officials’. It has also informed the Finnish government’s framing of climate change as a security issue including ‘ in the preparation of the upcoming government’s defence policy report and the inclusion of climate security among the themes of the latest call for the government’s research funding’ [5.12].
5. Sources to corroborate the impact
[5.1a-v] Report & supporting documentation/URLs on international media coverage from 2013-2019 highlighting the debate on the Israeli-Palestinian Joint Water Committee, Palestinian Water Authority, climate change and Syria and the war on access to resources referencing Jan Selby’s research
[5.2] Summary report on published reports from FAO (UN), IPCC, Al Haq, World Bank, UNCHR and Think-tanks citing Jan Selby’s research
[5.3a] [text removed for publication]
[5.3b] [text removed for publication]
[5.4a] [text removed for publication]
[5.4b] [text removed for publication]
[5.4c] [text removed for publication]
[5.4d] [text removed for publication]
[5.4e] [text removed for publication]
[5.5a-c] [text removed for publication]
[5.6] Most downloaded: Political Geography homepage https://www.journals.elsevier.com/political-geography + screenshot pdf on file
[5.7a-c] [text removed for publication]
[5.8] [text removed for publication]
[5.9] [text removed for publication]
[5.10] [text removed for publication]
[5.11] [text removed for publication].
[5.12] [text removed for publication].
- Submitting institution
- University of Sussex
- Unit of assessment
- 19 - Politics and International Studies
- Summary impact type
- Societal
- Is this case study continued from a case study submitted in 2014?
- No
1. Summary of the impact
Until recently, religion has either been neglected, or viewed as the ultimate threat to security by foreign policy makers. Petito’s research on postsecularism has contributed to a change in the policy mind-set and practices of the Italian, UK and other Western governments by questioning foreign policy makers’ secular blind spots and by developing action-oriented proposals that enable policymakers to better integrate religion into foreign policy. In particular, Petito’s work on religious engagement has significantly impacted on Italian foreign policy strategic planning, while his innovative approach to Freedom of Religion or Belief (FoRB) promotion has influenced European governments, as well as international organisations such as the EU & OSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe), leading them to develop new initiatives.
2. Underpinning research
Petito’s research on the role of religion in International Relations (IR) spans two decades. Initially leading the first ever research project on ‘Religion and IR Theory’ (1999-2004), Petito has since contributed to setting up a new reflexive research agenda to challenge the secularist bias of International Relations and the predominant assumption that the politicisation of religion is always an inescapable threat to security and inimical to modernity.
Since joining Sussex, Petito has expanded this line of interpretation, by exploring the theoretical implications of the postsecular debate for thinking about IR. Challenging secularisation as the master narrative of modernity and highlighting the ‘secular’ as a site of exclusion, his work has advanced the postsecular as a normative plea for new models of global politics able to include religious views [3.1]. He has also demonstrated the need to develop a postsecular sensibility in understanding international politics and in shaping foreign policy by removing what the diplomatic community has been increasingly acknowledging as ‘secular blind spots’ and creating new forms of secular-religious partnerships to respond to global challenges [3.2].
Moving his research to more applied work, he has focused on two new policy areas of growing interest to the foreign policy community: 1) religious engagement in foreign policy - how governments can engage with religious leaders and communities abroad to promote different foreign policy objectives, from development and human rights to peace building [3.3] [3.4]; and 2) the protection of Freedom of Religion or Belief (FoRB) through foreign policy - how governments can respond to the global trend towards greater religious persecution and discrimination [3.5] [3.6]. Petito’s research has developed innovative frameworks and action-oriented proposals to enable policymakers to better face the policy challenges above.
On religious engagement in foreign policy, two important contributions have been made as a result of this research. One is an innovative conception of religious engagement in foreign policy, which emphasizes the construction of a knowledge base for foreign policy generated through encounter and dialogue with religious communities and religious non-state actors [3.3]. The other is an Italian model of religious engagement in foreign policy. This is based on the idea that Italy, as the country which hosts the Holy See, has a unique geo-religious position as the hub of a global network of religious connections which it can use to develop a special model of religious engagement based on the unparalleled mass of Rome-based religious non-state actors as a forum of consultation and policy advice [3.4].
On the protection of FoRB through foreign policy, there have been two important results of this research that together call for a change in the dominant approach by governments and international organisations in response to the global crisis of FoRB. The first identifies the need for FoRB-promotion policies to emphasise bottom-up developmental strategies by balancing high-level declaratory statements and government-to-government diplomacy with engaging local stakeholders and developing activities in response to local concerns [3.5]. The second research insight taken up in policy here is the idea that religious actors should not only be seen by policy makers as the victims, or the perpetrators of FoRB violations, but as partners in building long-term strategies to advance FoRB and to foster pluralism, social cohesion and sustainable peace. In particular, interreligious engagment through dialogue and collaboration can be a useful policy tool to advance FoRB and combat intolerance based on religion or belief [3.6].
3. References to the research
[3.1] Petito, F. & Mavelli, L. (2012), “The Postsecular in International Relations: An Overview”, Review of International Studies, 38:5, 931-42. https://doi.org/10.1017/S026021051200040X
[3.2] Petito, F. & Mavelli, L. (2014), eds., Towards a Postsecular International Politics: New Forms of Community, Identity, and Power, New York: Palgrave, 288 pages. Available from HEI on request.
[3.3] Petito, F. & Thomas, S. (2015), “Encounter, Dialogue, and Knowledge: Italy as a Special Case of Religious Engagement in Foreign Policy”, The Review of Faith and International Affairs, 13: 2, 40-51. https://doi.org/10.1080/15570274.2015.1039303
[3.4] Petito, F. & Ferrara, P. (2016), “An Italian Foreign Policy of Religious Engagement: Challenges and Prospects”, The International Spectator, 51: 1, 28-43. https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2016.1120955
[3.5] Petito, F., M. Evans, J. Rehman & Thane, K. (2017), Article 18: From Rhetoric to Reality, Report of the UK APPG for International Freedom of Religion or Belief,1-56. https://appgfreedomofreligionorbelief.org/media/Article-18-report-1710.pdf Research-based report co-authored with two world-leading academic authorities on FoRB; peer reviewed by established scholars in the field (p2). Has since become a reference point for international religious freedom policy-oriented research (see [5.9]).
[3.6] Petito, F. (2020), “From Freedom of Religion or Belief (FoRB) Advocacy to Interreligious Engagement in Foreign Policy”, Global Affairs, 6:3, 269 - 286. https://doi.org/10.1080/23340460.2020.1845098
Funding from British Council/Henry Luce Foundation ‘Bridging Voices’ (‘Freedom of Religion or Belief (FoRB) and Foreign Policy’, PI: Petito, 09/2014 - 08/2015, $24,000).
4. Details of the impact
Since 2013, Petito’s research has enabled Western policymakers to: 1) integrate religious literacy and engagement in foreign policy, and 2) design and implement innovative strategies to promote FoRB through foreign policy. These two areas of impact were respectively developed through two major programmes and platforms for engagement led by Petito: The Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) initiative on ‘Religions and International Relations’ (2012-2017), institutionalised in 2018 as a programme based at the leading Italian think tank Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI); and the FoRB & Foreign Policy Initiative at the University of Sussex, started as a British Council/Luce Foundation funded project (2014-16) with a transatlantic focus, and officially launched in 2017 as a research and policy programme partnered with the FCO, the UK Parliament, the EU and Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)/Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR).
Influence on attitudes and religious engagement capacity of Italian MFA (and beyond)
In his testimonial, [text removed for publication] states: “it is very clear that within the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MFA], Petito is regarded as the preeminent thought leader with respect to the question of how religion fits into contemporary Italian diplomacy. Through my frequent interactions [text removed for publication] with the [text removed for publication] [Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs], I saw the very clear impact of Petito’s influence with respect to how Italy was approaching the challenge of integrating greater awareness and outreach capacity on religion into its day-to-day work. Indeed, it is not too much of an exaggeration to credit him as the person responsible for giving rise to and nurturing these impulses within the ministry” [5.1].
Since 2012, when Petito was officially nominated as the lead scientific coordinator of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ (MFA’s) initiative on Religions and International Relations, he has partnered with its Policy Planning Unit in co-designing a programme convening a yearly policy dialogue with policymakers and religious representatives, as well as other faith-based actors and experts. Each year the meetings considered a different issue of the postsecular agenda [3.1] drawing on a concept paper researched and drafted by Petito in dialogue with the Policy Planning Unit: in 2013, state-religions arrangements; in 2014, religious engagement; in 2015/16, the Middle Eastern crisis; in 2017, the refugee crisis; in 2018, sustainable peace; in 2019, interreligious engagement; in 2020, inclusive citizenship (for example concept paper, see [5.2]).
This work has raised awareness and improved the understanding of the global resurgence of religion and the postsecular predicament [3.2] in the Italian foreign policy-making community. The current [text removed for publication] states in his testimonial that “Petito has contributed many valuable insights and lines of interpretation, which have been tested through yearly events and a number of documents, and have then been translated into valuable policy recommendations”; and he concludes that “the initiative has had a remarkable impact on the analysis and considerations of the Policy Planning of the Ministry… as a consequence of these activities, the religious factor has progressively been embedded in the internal discussions of the Ministry and the opportunity to more intensively engage with religious actors is meeting increasing consensus among Italian foreign policy practitioners” [5.3]. The research has been used to design “a specific policy and action-oriented approach… thus contributing to more nuanced and effective policy-making” [5.3].
Petito’s research has also influenced the conceptual frameworks and practical tools mobilised by Italian diplomats. In his testimonial, [text removed for publication] referred to Petito’s postsecular framework [3.2] as “an invaluable tool in the exercise of my diplomatic functions and an added value in my official and informal contacts, in a country where violent religious extremism hit tragically during the ’90s”; he has also confirmed that “Petito’s research influenced in a decisive manner my way of thinking about my diplomatic functions. In particular, l owe him the concept of religious engagement [3.3], a new idea on how diplomatic agents should relate to religious actors in order to bring about justice and stability in a troubled world” [5.4].
The new model of religious engagement developed by Petito in the context of this Italian initiative (outlined in an internal concept paper [5.2], later expanded and published as [3.3] & [3.4]) has generated impact beyond Italy. The proposal was welcomed with interest by the Holy See, which first replied through its semi-official voice of Civiltà Cattolica – the only journal directly overseen and approved by the Secretariat of State of the Holy See – stating “this orientation is indicative of a new relationship between religion and states, which the Catholic Church appreciates” [5.5]. Petito subsequently accepted an invitation to attend a high level international conference in March 2016 with its top diplomat, the Secretary for the Relations with States, who in his remarks responded point-by-point to the proposals Petito had outlined in the framing document for the meeting [5.6]. The [text removed for publication], described the above conference “as a key milestone in the developing thinking of a number of foreign ministries (including the Holy See)” and went on to observe that “Petito’s research and publications during this period, alongside the conferences/events he organised, had significant impact on my and the FCO’s developing thinking in this area, and from my observation similarly on the work of other foreign ministries, in particular those of Italy, Germany, and the European Action Service (EAS)” [5.7].
Impact on FoRB-promotion strategies of FCO, Western governments, OSCE & EU
From 2014 onwards, Petito brought together policy makers and other stakeholders from North America and Europe to discuss how to strengthen transatlantic cooperation on FoRB-promotion. Following two successful closed-door dialogues at Wilton Park and Georgetown University, a Policy Brief [5.8] was launched at a policy dialogue at the House of Lords, which brought together numerous major international policy stakeholders. As a result, Petito was invited to be part of the newly established All Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) IFoRB (International FoRB) academic advisory board, to input into the revision of the FoRB FCO toolkit and, more instrumentally, to co-author a new major APPG report [3.5] aimed at raising the priority to protect FoRB internationally in UK Government policy, and arguing for new, bottom-up developmental strategies. Launched in Parliament in October 2017, it has already resulted in revisions to UK Government policy, via their adoption of three of the report’s major recommendations:
Requirements for all embassies to report on FoRB and use the new toolkit [5.9].
The inclusion of the promotion of FoRB in DFID’s strategic priorities. The 2018 UK Aid Connect call allocated £12m for a pilot programme to promote FoRB [5.10].
The appointment in July 2018 of the Prime Minister’s new Special Envoy on FoRB, FCO Minister, Lord Ahmad, whom to recognise Petito’s contribution gave his first speech setting the vision for his new role in a meeting in Parliament convened by Petito on 12 July 2018 [5.11].
In a personal letter to Petito, the [text removed for publication] stated that “the report has been praised by Government Ministers and Parliamentarians and was referenced several times during the APPG Westminster Hall’s debate on International FoRB day. It was also profiled by 15 media organisations, including BBC Radio 4… After the report’s launch, the [relevant] FCO Ministers of State re-issued the FCO toolkit on FoRB to all British embassies and high commissions… and asked them to report on what they are doing to advance FoRB.” [5.9]
In 2018 Petito led a year-long major multi-stakeholder consultation process under the patronage of the 2018 Italian OSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe) Chairmanship to co-produce innovative knowledge on interreligious engagement as a policy tool to advance FoRB and combat intolerance based on religion or belief [3.6]. The key message of the final report of the consultation (presented and discussed on 6 Dec 2018 at the 25th OSCE Ministerial Council in Milan) was adopted, almost verbatim, as one of the points of the 2018 OSCE Chairmanship-in-Office Conclusions on FoRB, Tolerance and Non-Discrimination. It offers “the warmest encouragement of initiatives to promote interreligious dialogue and partnerships, also through the inclusion and engagement of religious and belief communities in public discussions…as partners in building long term strategies to advance FoRB for all and foster pluralism, social cohesion and sustainable peace.” [5.12]
Three policy outcomes have emerged from the dissemination of this research [3.6]:
The OSCE/ODIHR convened in Oct 2018 its Panel of FoRB Experts, regarded as one of the major international mechanisms focusing on FoRB together with the UN special rapporteur on FoRB, to draft guidelines on Interfaith and Interreligious Dialogue and Partnerships. In that context, Petito’s findings were presented to inform their work. Furthermore, in recognition of this work in June 2019 Petito was appointed for a 3-year term as the UK representative to the 16-member panel of FoRB experts selected from the 57 OSCE participant states and is currently a member of the working group writing the above guidelines.
The model of interreligious engagement was endorsed by senior diplomats with relevant portfolios, such as the Advisor for Religious Affairs of the French MFA and the Finnish Ambassador-at-Large for Intercultural and Interreligious Dialogue Processes in a series of video-interviews given at the recent meeting convened by the Italian MFA in partnership with the Transatlantic Policy Network on Religion and Diplomacy [5.13]. As a result, Petito was hired as a consultant (2019-20) by the German Ministry for International Cooperation and Development (BMZ) to assist the German Commissioner for Global Freedom of Religion with the design of its first ever FoRB pilot programmes. Currently Petito has been developing in partnership with Wilton Park (FCO) and United States Agency for International Development (US AID) a follow-up policy dialogue initiative on FoRB & the SDGs (UN Sustainable Development Goals) now rescheduled for early 2021 [5.14]. All initiatives delayed by COVID.
Petito was invited by Jan Figel, the EU Special Envoy for the Promotion of FoRB outside the EU, to chair the final high-profile stock-taking event of his temporary mandate (2016-19) (Brussels, 19-20 Oct 2019) and to assist with the drafting of the related final report for the newly appointed president of the European Commission. The report [5.15] specifically endorses Petito’s ideas as the third of only five action-oriented recommendations put forward and emphatically states its “support [for] the model of ‘interreligious engagement’ put forward by a recent report of the FoRB & Foreign Policy Initiative of the University of Sussex” (p. 10). On 9 July 2020 the EC announced the official renewal of the Special Envoy mandate.
5. Sources to corroborate the impact
[5.1] [text removed for publication].
[5.2] Petito, F., & Thomas, S. (2014). “Foreign policy and religious engagement: the special case of Italy”, Concept Paper, Italian MFA-ISPI, October 2014, Milan, 1-10. https://www.ispionline.it/it/documents/Concept_Paper_religion.pdf
[5.3] [text removed for publication]
[5.4] [text removed for publication].
[5.5] Pierre de Charentenay, ‘Religione e politica estera: Il caso Italia’, La Civiltà Cattolica (2015): 238-46. https://www.ispionline.it/it/documents/CivCatt_deChartenay.pdf
[5.6] Arch. Paul R. Gallagher, “Religious Engagement in the Current Mediterranean Crisis: What can be done?”, speech at the conference ‘Religion and Diplomacy: A New Strategic Pillar for a Comprehensive Mediterrannean Dialogue’, Farnesina, Rome, 17 March 2016.
[5.7] [text removed for publication].
[5.8] Petito, F. et al., “Recognising our differences can be our strength: Enhancing transatlantic cooperation on promoting FoRB”, Policy Brief, University of Sussex, 2016, 1-4. http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/69060/1/FoRB_Transatlantic_policy_briefing_2016.pdf
[5.9] [text removed for publication].
[5.10] UK DFID (8 November 2018), Government commits £12 million to champion freedom of religion or belief worldwide, Press Release. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-commits-12-million-to-champion-freedom-of-religion-or-belief-worldwide
[5.11] UK Government (4 July 2018), Lord Ahmad appointed as PM’s Special Envoy to promote religious freedom, Press Release. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/lord-ahmad-appointed-as-pms-special-envoy-to-promote-religious-freedom
[5.12] 2018 OSCE Chairmanship-in-Office Conclusions, “Freedom of Religion and Belief, Tolerance and Non-Discrimination” , MC.GAL/9/18, Milan, 7 December 2018. https://www.esteri.it/mae/resource/doc/2018/12/mcgal0009_cio_conclusions_freedom_rel__belief_tol__non-discr.pdf
[5.13] Video-interviews with selected participants to the policy dialogue ‘At the Intersection of Interreligious Engagement, FoRB & SDGs’, Italian MFA-ISPI, Bologna, 6-7 Mar 2019. https://www.ispionline.it/en/eventi/evento/intersection-interreligious-engagement-freedom-religion-or-belief-forb-sustainable-development - pdfs + videos available on request
[5.14] Wilton Park, Freedom of Religion or Belief & Sustainable Development Goals, Concept & Provisional Programme.
[5.15] EU Special Envoy on FoRB outside the EU, European Commission (2019), The mandate of the Special Envoy for the promotion of freedom of religion or belief outside the European Union: activities and recommendations (May 2016-Nov 2019), Report, Brussels, Nov 2019, 1-16. PDF
- Submitting institution
- University of Sussex
- Unit of assessment
- 19 - Politics and International Studies
- Summary impact type
- Societal
- Is this case study continued from a case study submitted in 2014?
- No
1. Summary of the impact
Stavrianakis’ research examines the under-scrutinised and often secretive policy and practices of UK arms exports using a range of methods, including unprecedented applications of UK Freedom of Information (FOI) law to this policy area. Her research has had impact in two principal areas: 1) exposing the operation of unlawful export policy and practice, through FOI requests and media commentary; and 2) supporting key beneficiary groups – including: UK Parliamentary Select Committees and other MPs; NGOs and campaign groups; and members of the Opposition and Shadow Cabinet – to hold the UK government to account and advocate for proper implementation and enforcement of the UK’s foreign policy and legal obligations.
2. Underpinning research
The impact documented here emanates from Stavrianakis’ research into UK arms export policy, in particular towards Saudi Arabia during the war in Yemen since 2015, and the negotiation and implementation of the UN Arms Trade Treaty. Conducting this research has involved interviews with civil servants from across the different UK government departments responsible for arms export licensing and MPs engaged in scrutinising government policy; participant observation work during parliamentary inquiries; participant observation and interview work with NGOs active on the arms trade such as Amnesty International, Campaign Against Arms Trade, the Control Arms coalition, Oxfam, and Saferworld; Freedom of Information requests; and documentary analysis. Some of the research has been funded by the ESRC and HEIF and through consultancy work. The key research findings are:
*Reckless, not robust: Stavrianakis’ analysis of UK arms export policy towards Saudi Arabia demonstrates that the UK government is failing to implement its publicly-stated policy and legal obligations that restrict arms exports where there is a clear risk that they might be used in a violation of international humanitarian law, and is instead primarily concerned with managing domestic criticism and maintaining good relations with the Saudi government [3.1, 3.2, 3.4]. The research uncovered similar patterns in UK policy towards the wider Middle East and North Africa, for example in relation to Egypt during the Arab Spring [3.3]. Through active strategies of creating doubt and ambiguity about the risks of arms exports, the UK government demonstrates an unwillingness to pay adequate attention to potential civilian harm, and an indifference to the consequences of its policy, continuing to issue export licences despite overwhelming evidence of the misuse of weapons in Yemen. Thus UK arms export policy is better characterised as reckless rather than robust [3.4]. The research found the UK licensing process to be characterised by ritualized activity that functions to create the appearance of control and an image of benevolence and restraint, rather than to meaningfully restrict arms exports [3.5].
Legitimation, not restriction:* The UK is one of the world’s largest arms exporters and a supporter of states that abuse human rights and violate international humanitarian law such as Saudi Arabia. Simultaneously, the UK has also been a key champion of the UN Arms Trade Treaty, both during its negotiation and as a State Party [3.3]. The UK thus claims to promote the highest standards of international regulation whilst it regularly authorises exports that violate those standards. International arms transfer control regimes such as the Arms Trade Treaty primarily serve a legitimising function to buttress the UK’s (and other liberal states’) international reputation rather than to impose any meaningful restrictions [3.3]. Critical analysis of such regulatory regimes demonstrates the transformation and resurgence of a variety of forms of militarism around the world [3.6] and the ways in which the UK government is using risk assessment in ways that allow them to remain ignorant about violations of international humanitarian law. In other words, the UK government is mobilising risk assessment to facilitate rather than prevent harm [3.4].
Exposing the state’s strategies is not only important in itself, but also for recasting future policy. Stavrianakis’ research exposes the fundamental causes - in UK bureaucratic and governmental practice - of the reckless flow of UK arms that has exacerbated key civilian harms in the Yemen conflict since 2015, and particularly in Yemen’s air war [3.4]. Stavrianakis’ findings also cast doubt on the UK government’s compliance with obligations under domestic law and the UN Arms Trade Treaty to assess the risks of the misuse of UK-supplied weapons [3.3].
3. References to the research
[3.1] Stavrianakis, A. “Playing with words while Yemen burns. Managing criticism of UK arms exports to Saudi Arabia,” Global Policy, 2017, 8(4): 563-568 https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12484
[3.2] Stavrianakis, A. “When ‘anxious scrutiny’ of arms exports facilitates humanitarian disaster,” Political Quarterly, 2018, 89(1): 92-99 https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-923X.12435
[3.3] Stavrianakis, A. “Legitimising Liberal Militarism. Politics, Law and War in the UN Arms Trade Treaty,” Third World Quarterly, 2016, 37(5), pp. 840-865 https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.1113867
[3.4] Stavrianakis, A. “Requiem for Risk: Non-knowledge and domination in the governance of weapons circulation,” International Political Sociology, 2020, 14(3), pp. 233-251 https://doi.org/10.1093/ips/olz030
[3.5] Stavrianakis, A. “Licensed to Kill: Arms export licensing in the United Kingdom”, Economics of Peace and Security Journal, 2008, 3(1), pp. 32-39 http://dx.doi.org/10.15355/epsj.3.1.32
[3.6] Stavrianakis, A. “Controlling weapons circulation in a postcolonial militarised world,” Review of International Studies, 2019, 45(1): 57-76 https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210518000190
4. Details of the impact
1) Exposing the operation of unlawful arms export policy through FOI requests and media commentary
Over the course of twenty months from September 2017, Stavrianakis pursued the release of information from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) under the Freedom of Information Act, regarding the grounds on which arms export licences to Saudi Arabia were referred to ministers and approved. After three complaints to the Information Commissioner about the FCO’s handling of the request, Stavrianakis secured the release of new information into the public domain in May 2019 that revealed that the Foreign Secretary was content to issue licences for arms exports to Saudi Arabia despite ongoing attacks on civilians [5.1a]. The release of information is itself an unusual victory and generated criticism of the FCO’s behaviour: the Information Commissioner was critical of the FCO for seeking to “frustrate a requester’s right of access [to] information,” expressing the hope that “such delays … are not repeated by the FCO in future” [5.1b]. Through collaboration with Campaign Against Arms Trade, Stavrianakis secured media coverage to publicise the findings and document the unlawful operation of UK arms export policy. The FOI information was used as the basis for news stories in The Guardian (shared 9,517 times on Facebook to date and with the potential to reach 111,155 readers in hard copy and 14.62 million viewers online based on The Guardian’s UVPM) and The Independent on 11 June 2019 that were critical of UK support for Saudi Arabia despite growing evidence of unlawful civilian harm, and repeated in later coverage as the war in Yemen progressed [5.2, M1-3].
Since 2016 Stavrianakis has engaged in scrutiny in the public domain, including the front page of the online edition of The Independent, comment pieces for The Guardian that have been shared hundreds of times on social media, and an interview with the BBC World Service, the latter with potential reach of 97 million listeners [5.2, M4-8], mobilising the arguments from her research [3.1; 3.2; 3.3; 3.4] to explain why the way in which Whitehall and ministers make decisions about arms exports licences to Saudi Arabia contravenes the UK government’s legal obligations around international humanitarian law. Her research has also been picked up by the UN, whose Office for Disarmament Affairs included her work in its “Disarmament Digest” of December 2018, and by Crisis Action, a global NGO coalition, in its “Must-Reads” list of February 2019 [5.3, 5.4].
On 20 June 2019 the Court of Appeal found that UK arms sales to Saudi Arabia are unlawful. Stavrianakis engaged in extensive media work relating to her research [3.4] to explain the significance and implications of the ruling, including serving as the main commentator on BBC Radio 4 The World at One – which has on average 1.4 million daily listeners - on the day of the ruling. She also wrote comment pieces for The Guardian and other media outlets that were shared hundreds of times on social media and was quoted in a news story in The Guardian that has been shared 11,055 times on Facebook [5.2, M9-14]. Her media work drew the attention of a barrister engaged in legal action for criminal acts committed in Yemen and a London-based communications agency, Revolt, both of whom approached her for further information and advice [5.5]. Her media commentary was reproduced by specialist organisations such as Scientists for Global Responsibility and the Yemen Safe Passage Group to educate their members and audiences about arms exports, with the former ‘liked’ 1.5K times [5.6a-c]. In July 2020 the UK government concluded that potential breaches of international law by the Saudi-led coalition amounted to isolated incidents and that it would resume arms licensing. Stavrianakis responded publicly by explaining the political and legal manoeuvring required to reach such a decision, in a comment piece shared 350 times on social media and with a potential reach of up to 477,000 viewers online (based on Middle East Eye’s UVPM) [5.2, M15].
In August 2019 Stavrianakis brokered the exposure in The Guardian that weapons components made in Brighton were found at the site of air strikes in Yemen deemed by the UN to violate international law. A Brighton activist had discovered the evidence in a UN report and secured local media coverage in July, including a quotation from Stavrianakis. Stavrianakis then persuaded The Guardian of the merit of the story and secured its publication in the national press, again providing a quote for the article based on her research demonstrating the hollowness of the UK government’s commitment to international law [3.3; 3.4] (print and online – see The Guardian’s UVPM, above); it has also been shared 830 times to date on Facebook [5.2, M16-M18]. The local and national coverage was picked up by activist organisations such as War Resisters International and the publicity around the case prompted 33 local councillors and a local MP to write to Defence Secretary Ben Wallace calling for an investigation into the incident and the suspension of licences for the local company [5.7].
2) Working with key beneficiary groups to hold government to account and advocate for implementation of UK obligations
Stavrianakis worked actively with three key beneficiary groups to mobilise her research findings, to publicly demonstrate the flaws in the UK government’s implementation of its legal obligations, hold the UK government to account, and advocate for proper implementation of the UK’s legal obligations.
(i) The Parliamentary Committees on Arms Export Controls (CAEC)
The CAEC - made up of MPs from the Defence, Foreign Affairs, International Development (until the merger of DfID into the FCO) and International Trade Committees – is the key formal means of parliamentary scrutiny and democratic accountability for arms exports in the UK political system. Arms export policy is one of the most secretive and intractable areas of public policy, with extensive government and industry efforts to manage transparency and minimise accountability. Stavrianakis has had impact by resourcing and enabling the scrutiny of MPs in favour of arms control and generating resistance from pro-export MPs across three Committee inquiries.
Stavrianakis submitted written evidence based on her research [3.1] to the “Inquiry into the use of UK-manufactured weapons in Yemen” following the CAEC’s call for submissions in 2016 and was subsequently invited to give oral evidence [5.8, P1]. Hers was one of two written submissions from academics and the only one that was critical of government policy. Stavrianakis was the only academic to give oral evidence [5.8, P2, 5.9]. The inquiry, chaired by Chris White MP, become controversial because of a split in the CAEC as to whether they should recommend a suspension of arms exports to the Saudi-led coalition or not. The Committees’ initial draft report was leaked to Newsnight and the CAEC broke down. Two rival reports were published by different constituent Committees of the CAEC: one by the International Development and Business Committees; the other by the Foreign Affairs Committee. Stavrianakis’ evidence is quoted in both reports (e.g. noting her evidence that the government had speeded up its licensing process, and that the government is preventing scrutiny of its practices); her conclusion in favour of a suspension of arms exports is taken up in the former report but excluded in the latter [5.8, P3]. The Chair of the CAEC found her to be “well-briefed and comprehensive and fair in your evidence to the Committee, adding an important academic perspective” [5.9].
Stavrianakis submitted written evidence to another CAEC inquiry, its “Inquiry into UK arms exports during 2016” and was invited to give oral evidence [5.8, P4]. She was one of two academics to submit written evidence and the only one to focus on UK export policy: the subject of her research [3.2, 3.5]. She was one of three academics who gave oral evidence and the only one to say anything critical of UK policy, based on her evidence of failures of the UK licensing system [5.8, P5]. This inquiry was chaired by a new Chair of the CAEC, Graham Jones MP. During oral evidence, on three occasions the pro-Saudi and pro-export Chair sought to undermine Stavrianakis’ evidence by making verbal interventions contesting her evidence beyond the normal probing of witnesses, for example about the judicial review, on which Stavrianakis was later proved correct when the Court of Appeal found against the government [5.8, P6].
Stavrianakis was the only academic to submit written evidence to the “2017 Arms Exports Annual Report Inquiry”, arguing on the basis of her research [3.1; 3.2; 3.4] that the UK’s application of its arms export criteria with regard to Saudi Arabia indicates that UK policy is reckless, not robust [5.8, P7]. The issue of arms exports to Saudi Arabia was excluded from the inquiry’s agenda, despite Saudi Arabia accounting for almost half of UK arms exports. Critical voices, including those of Stavrianakis, were excluded from giving oral evidence to the Committees [5.8, P8, 5.10]. The exclusion of Stavrianakis was cited as a reason for the withdrawal of Corruption Watch, an NGO critical of the government, from giving evidence to Parliament [5.10].
Given the repeated failure of the CAEC to scrutinise arms export policy towards the Saudi-led coalition, Stavrianakis published an op-ed piece in The Guardian to publicise the accountability gap [5.2, M19] and worked with pro-arms control MPs led by Lloyd Russell-Moyle MP alongside civil society actors to set up and participate in a “Citizens’ Committee on the Arms Trade” on 22 May 2019. This was a public event held in Parliament directly after a CAEC evidence session and featured Stavrianakis alongside five other experts; Stavrianakis’ intervention focused on her research into the failures of UK controls and inadequacy of parliamentary scrutiny [3.2; 3.4; 3.5]. The session, attended by approx. 100 civil society activists and members of the public, voted informally to suspend arms sales to Saudi Arabia and was broadcast on Al Jazeera Arabic TV and picked up in the UK press in stories in The Guardian and The Independent that include interviews and quotes with Stavrianakis, and also shared hundreds of times on Facebook (see The Guardian’s UVPM, above) [5.2, M20-M22].
(ii) NGOs and campaign/activist groups
Stavrianakis’ work amplifies oppositional civil society voices such as Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT) who are regularly excluded from giving evidence to CAEC, or not quoted in CAEC reports. She has worked with CAAT for over fifteen years, served on their Steering Committee (2005-9) and currently serves as a Trustee for the Trust for Research and Education on the Arms Trade (TREAT), a grant-making charity that supports CAAT’s work [5.11a]. CAAT has used Stavrianakis’ research into the legitimising function of arms transfer controls as an educational and campaigning tool to inform and engage supporters [5.11b]. CAAT’s Parliamentary Coordinator attests that Stavrianakis has made an “exceptionally useful contribution to the debate around arms exports” [5.12], and describes her oral and written evidence to CAEC as “invaluable in getting parliamentarians engaged in considering the issue” [5.12]. In relation to the judicial review, Stavrianakis worked with the CAAT Press Officer as part of their media strategy, providing quotes calling for a suspension of arms exports to Saudi Arabia so they could mobilise her expertise based on her research. CAAT put journalists in touch with her, and her media work has supported CAAT’s strategy by bringing its judicial review of UK arms export policy to a wider public audience [5.2, M23-M24].
Stavrianakis also supports the work of other NGOs that are invited to Parliament, such as Saferworld, Amnesty International and Oxfam, by creating space for more robust criticism of UK government policy than they can make publicly. For example, during a CAEC evidence session, Committee members asked NGOs to respond to the conclusion of Stavrianakis’ research [3.1; 3.2; 3.4] that UK policy is “reckless, not robust”, which they were able to agree with even though as humanitarian and peacebuilding organisations operating in Yemen itself they could not make such a strong or explicit statement themselves [5.8, P9].
**(iii) The Opposition and Shadow Cabinet **
Since 2016 Stavrianakis has provided research briefings based on her research [3.1-3.6] to inform Labour Party policy on arms exports and push the party to develop restrictive, anti-militarist alternatives to the UK government’s arms export policy. She provided a written contribution to the Shadow Defence Review and briefed Shadow Defence Secretary Emily Thornberry MP on it in May 2016; and in March 2018 she provided a written briefing to the Shadow Cabinet [5.13a]. Members of the Shadow Cabinet, in particular Emily Thornberry as Shadow Foreign Secretary, and Labour Party MPs Stephen Twigg, Stephen Doughty and Lloyd Russell-Moyle (all involved in the CAEC), have made public calls for a suspension of arms sales to Saudi Arabia and an independent international investigation, echoing Stavrianakis’ public (media) and private (briefings) interventions [5.13b]. These interventions led to [text removed for publication] [5.13c]. Stavrianakis’ recommendations around parliamentary scrutiny were included in a speech delivered by Jeremy Corbyn in York on 1 December 2019 in which he pledged to “increase oversight of arms exports to ensure we’re not fuelling conflicts” as well as to “stop arms sales to Saudi Arabia for use in Yemen” [5.13d].
5. Sources to corroborate the impact
[5.1a] Release of information: FCO information for release, FOI 0890-017, pdf
[5.1b] Criticism of FCO: ICO Decision notice 23/4/19; Institute for Government, “Percentage of FOI requests granted in full, by department”, pdf
[5.2] Media report: Entries M1-M24, with urls and circulation figures, pdf.
[5.3] Media work picked up by UN Office for Disarmament Affairs “Disarmament Digest”, pdf
[5.4] Media work picked up by Crisis Action “Yemen Media Review”, pdf
[5.5] Email correspondence, pdf
[5.6a] Media work reproduced by Yemen Safe Passage Group [text removed for publication]
[5.6b] Yemen Safe Passage Group Update (11/2/20), pdf
[5.6c]; Scientists for Global Responsibility website, https://www.sgr.org.uk/resources/holding-uk-account-its-role-war-yemen - ‘liked’ 1.5K times
[5.7] Letter from councillors: https://www.brighton-hove.gov.uk/news/2019/councillors-call-clampdown-brighton-arms-manufacturer
[5.8] Summary report of written and oral evidence submitted and presented by Stavrianakis to UK Parliamentary Committees 2016-2019, Entries, with urls, P1-P9, pdf
[5.9] Testimonial from Chris White MP, Chair of CAEC, pdf
[5.10] Letter from Corruption Watch to CAEC, pdf
[5.11a] TREAT trustee: https://www.treat-research.org.uk/
[5.11b] Educational & campaigning tool: The Façade of Arms Export Control, CAAT Goodwin Paper #6, 02/08 https://www.caat.org.uk/resources/publications/government/facade-2008-02.pdf
[5.12] Testimonial from Ann Feltham, CAAT Parliamentary Coordinator, pdf
[5.13a] Briefings for Shadow Defence Review, Shadow Cabinet, pdf
[5.13b] Shadow Cabinet and Labour MPs: Emily Thornberry MP, Stephen Twigg MP, Stephen Doughty MP, Lloyd Russell-Moyle MP statements in Parliament e.g. https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2018-09-11/debates/80DF7C45-8C6C-4D16-80C7-109E190E4D53/Yemen (11/9/18)
[5.13c] [text removed for publication]
[5.13d] [text removed for publication]; Jeremy Corbyn York speech 1/12/19, https://labour.org.uk/press/full-text-of-jeremy-corbyns-speech-in-york/