Morality and Epistemic Judgement: The Argument from Analogy
- Submitting institution
-
University of Durham
- Unit of assessment
- 30 - Philosophy
- Output identifier
- 114488
- Type
- A - Authored book
- DOI
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10.1093/oso/9780198842736.001.0001
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- ISBN
- 9780198842736
- Open access status
- -
- Month of publication
- -
- Year of publication
- 2019
- URL
-
-
- Supplementary information
-
-
- Request cross-referral to
- -
- Output has been delayed by COVID-19
- No
- COVID-19 affected output statement
- -
- Forensic science
- No
- Criminology
- No
- Interdisciplinary
- No
- Number of additional authors
-
-
- Research group(s)
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C - Aesthetics, Ethics and Politics
- Proposed double-weighted
- Yes
- Double-weighted statement
- This 80,000 word, 256-page monograph, written over the course of three years, defends moral error theory via a comparison with epistemic judgment. Chapters 3 and 4 outline and defend a series of important disanalogies between morality and epistemic judgment and jointly constitute at least one journal article’s worth of material. Likewise, chapters 5 through 9 present a worked-through account of epistemic reductionism that constitute at least one further article’s worth of material.
- Reserve for an output with double weighting
- No
- Additional information
- -
- Author contribution statement
- -
- Non-English
- No
- English abstract
- -
