Sound auction specification and implementation
- Submitting institution
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The University of Birmingham
- Unit of assessment
- 11 - Computer Science and Informatics
- Output identifier
- 54749992
- Type
- E - Conference contribution
- DOI
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10.1145/2764468.2764511
- Title of conference / published proceedings
- EC '15 Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
- First page
- 547
- Volume
- -
- Issue
- -
- ISSN
- -
- Open access status
- -
- Month of publication
- June
- Year of publication
- 2015
- URL
-
-
- Supplementary information
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- Request cross-referral to
- -
- Output has been delayed by COVID-19
- No
- COVID-19 affected output statement
- -
- Forensic science
- No
- Criminology
- No
- Interdisciplinary
- Yes
- Number of additional authors
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3
- Research group(s)
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-
- Citation count
- -
- Proposed double-weighted
- No
- Reserve for an output with double weighting
- No
- Additional information
- The ACM conference on Economics and Computation is the premier and most prestigious event at the interface between computer science and economics. The paper is the first to formalize logically combinatorial Vickrey auctions, an important mechanism for simultaneous second price auctions on sets of goods. The formalization allows not only proof of the known theorems on these auction formalisms, but also to automatically extract running code in the Scala programming language. This way implementation problems can be eliminated from the development cycle for auction software. The paper summarizes the result of an EPSRC project on the topic.
- Author contribution statement
- -
- Non-English
- No
- English abstract
- -