Broken hearted : How to attack ECG biometrics
- Submitting institution
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Royal Holloway and Bedford New College
- Unit of assessment
- 11 - Computer Science and Informatics
- Output identifier
- 31308996
- Type
- E - Conference contribution
- DOI
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10.14722/ndss.2017.23408
- Title of conference / published proceedings
- Network and Distributed System Security Symposium
- First page
- 1
- Volume
- -
- Issue
- -
- ISSN
- -
- Open access status
- -
- Month of publication
- February
- Year of publication
- 2017
- URL
-
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- Supplementary information
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- Request cross-referral to
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- Output has been delayed by COVID-19
- No
- COVID-19 affected output statement
- -
- Forensic science
- No
- Criminology
- No
- Interdisciplinary
- No
- Number of additional authors
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5
- Research group(s)
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-
- Citation count
- -
- Proposed double-weighted
- No
- Reserve for an output with double weighting
- No
- Additional information
- This work is the first to demonstrate vulnerabilities of ECG biometrics, one of most promising types of biometrics spurred by modern wearable devices. The method, evaluated on a commercial device, the Nymi band, allows generation of cross-context attacks, i.e., use of signals from a surrogate device to attack a different target device, by learning optimal transformations between the ECG feature distributions of the two devices. It appeared in NDSS, one of the leading venues in security, gaining the attention of the security and biometrics communities and inspired follow up by Ebertz et al 2018 on multiple biometrics (10.1109/SP.2018.00053).
- Author contribution statement
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- Non-English
- No
- English abstract
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