La conception Transatlantique de sécurité du gouvernement Clemenceau à la Conférence de Paix de Paris, 1919
- Submitting institution
-
University of Glasgow
- Unit of assessment
- 28 - History
- Output identifier
- 28-03925
- Type
- D - Journal article
- DOI
-
10.3917/hes.194.0065
- Title of journal
- Histoire, economie et societe
- Article number
- -
- First page
- 65
- Volume
- 38
- Issue
- 4
- ISSN
- 0752-5702
- Open access status
- Compliant
- Month of publication
- -
- Year of publication
- 2019
- URL
-
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/171061/
- Supplementary information
-
-
- Request cross-referral to
- -
- Output has been delayed by COVID-19
- No
- COVID-19 affected output statement
- -
- Forensic science
- No
- Criminology
- No
- Interdisciplinary
- No
- Number of additional authors
-
0
- Research group(s)
-
-
- Proposed double-weighted
- No
- Reserve for an output with double weighting
- Yes
- Additional information
- -
- Author contribution statement
- -
- Non-English
- Yes
- English abstract
- This article argues that interpreting France’s policy at the Paris Peace Conference as a failed bid to destroy German power and to secure a dominant position in the post-1918 European political order obscures a trans-Atlantic conception of future international order within the Clemenceau government's programme, which rested on a shared commitment to democracy between France, Great Britain and the United States. The aim - anticipating geo-political developments during and after the Second World War - was to enmesh Germany in a new security order that would be underpinned by the superior economic and military resources of the victorious Allied powers.
