One TPM to Bind Them All: Fixing TPM 2.0 for Provably Secure Anonymous Attestation
- Submitting institution
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The University of Surrey
- Unit of assessment
- 11 - Computer Science and Informatics
- Output identifier
- 9023586_2
- Type
- E - Conference contribution
- DOI
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10.1109/SP.2017.22
- Title of conference / published proceedings
- 2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
- First page
- 0
- Volume
- 0
- Issue
- 0
- ISSN
- -
- Open access status
- -
- Month of publication
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- Year of publication
- 2017
- URL
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- Supplementary information
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- Request cross-referral to
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- Output has been delayed by COVID-19
- No
- COVID-19 affected output statement
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- Forensic science
- No
- Criminology
- No
- Interdisciplinary
- No
- Number of additional authors
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- Research group(s)
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- Citation count
- 10
- Proposed double-weighted
- No
- Reserve for an output with double weighting
- No
- Additional information
- The Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is an international standard for a security chip. TPMs have been embedded in over a billion computer platforms. In this paper, we identified several weaknesses in the TPM specifications and provided solutions. Some of these solutions have been incorporated into the standard, while others are waiting for a more significant revision. Surrey’s main contribution was to provide new specifications for the TPM 2.0 interfaces necessary to implement these changes. In addition, we also showed how these modifications to the TPM standard strengthen the security of different use cases, such as U-Prove and e-cash.
- Author contribution statement
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- Non-English
- No
- English abstract
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