Chip and skim: Cloning EMV cards with the pre-play attack
- Submitting institution
-
University of Cambridge
- Unit of assessment
- 11 - Computer Science and Informatics
- Output identifier
- 1846
- Type
- D - Journal article
- DOI
-
10.1109/SP.2014.11
- Title of journal
- Proceedings - IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
- Article number
- -
- First page
- 49
- Volume
- abs/1209.2531
- Issue
- -
- ISSN
- 1081-6011
- Open access status
- Out of scope for open access requirements
- Month of publication
- January
- Year of publication
- 2014
- URL
-
-
- Supplementary information
-
-
- Request cross-referral to
- -
- Output has been delayed by COVID-19
- No
- COVID-19 affected output statement
- -
- Forensic science
- No
- Criminology
- No
- Interdisciplinary
- No
- Number of additional authors
-
4
- Research group(s)
-
-
- Citation count
- 23
- Proposed double-weighted
- No
- Reserve for an output with double weighting
- No
- Additional information
- This paper documented a set of vulnerabilities in payment card terminals and ATMs. If you can predict the random number that will be used in a future EMV payment transaction, you can record everything you need to impersonate a card given momentary access to the card now. In another variant, tampered terminals can record transactions for replay in the future. This paper was published at the prestigious IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy in 2014, updating the earlier work from 2012. These attacks have happened in the wild, and the work has helped victims secure refunds.
- Author contribution statement
- -
- Non-English
- No
- English abstract
- -
