Executive Compensation in Imperfect Financial Markets
- Submitting institution
-
University of York
- Unit of assessment
- 18 - Law
- Output identifier
- 62888615
- Type
- A - Authored book
- DOI
-
-
- Publisher
- Edward Elgar Publishing
- ISBN
- 9781782549284
- Open access status
- -
- Month of publication
- October
- Year of publication
- 2014
- URL
-
-
- Supplementary information
-
-
- Request cross-referral to
- -
- Output has been delayed by COVID-19
- No
- COVID-19 affected output statement
- -
- Forensic science
- No
- Criminology
- No
- Interdisciplinary
- No
- Number of additional authors
-
0
- Research group(s)
-
-
- Proposed double-weighted
- Yes
- Double-weighted statement
- This book examines the relationship between executive compensation and financial stability. It brings legal analysis together with heterodox economic theory and an original analysis and modelling of financial data. It uses this to examine and evaluate different approaches to executive compensation, and suggest reforms that are likely to eliminate incentives that distort markets and increase institutional instability. Carrying out this analysis, drawing these very different perspectives together, and bringing them back to the questions of law and policy that the book takes up required six years of sustained research effort, as a result of which this book merits double-weighting.
- Reserve for an output with double weighting
- No
- Additional information
- -
- Author contribution statement
- -
- Non-English
- No
- English abstract
- -