'Ooh Aah... Just a Little Bit' : A Small Amount of Side Channel Can Go a Long Way
- Submitting institution
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University of Bristol
- Unit of assessment
- 11 - Computer Science and Informatics
- Output identifier
- 94282937
- Type
- E - Conference contribution
- DOI
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10.1007/978-3-662-44709-3_5
- Title of conference / published proceedings
- Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems - CHES 2014
- First page
- 75
- Volume
- 8731
- Issue
- -
- ISSN
- 0302-9743
- Open access status
- Out of scope for open access requirements
- Month of publication
- September
- Year of publication
- 2014
- URL
-
-
- Supplementary information
-
-
- Request cross-referral to
- -
- Output has been delayed by COVID-19
- No
- COVID-19 affected output statement
- -
- Forensic science
- No
- Criminology
- No
- Interdisciplinary
- No
- Number of additional authors
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3
- Research group(s)
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B - Cybersecurity and Cryptography
- Citation count
- 66
- Proposed double-weighted
- No
- Reserve for an output with double weighting
- No
- Additional information
- One of the first works looking at practical "Flush+Reload" side-channel attacks on caches. These attacks saw further extension in the recent high profile SPECTRE and MELTDOWN attacks on all microprocessors. Our early work on "Flush+Reload" side channel attacks in this paper showed how a small amount of leakage from co-resident programs on a cloud service can lead to catastrophic security failures. Follow up work by co-author Yarom [CCS 2020] showed similar attacks could be applied to the micro-architecture. These extensions (including SPECTRE and MELTDOWN) led to a major rethinking by chip manufacturers of their design space; w.r.t security versus privacy.
- Author contribution statement
- -
- Non-English
- No
- English abstract
- -