On Weak Keys and Forgery Attacks Against Polynomial-Based MAC Schemes
- Submitting institution
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Royal Holloway and Bedford New College
- Unit of assessment
- 11 - Computer Science and Informatics
- Output identifier
- 30401650
- Type
- D - Journal article
- DOI
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10.1007/s00145-014-9178-9
- Title of journal
- Journal of Cryptology
- Article number
- -
- First page
- 769
- Volume
- 28
- Issue
- -
- ISSN
- 0933-2790
- Open access status
- Out of scope for open access requirements
- Month of publication
- September
- Year of publication
- 2014
- URL
-
-
- Supplementary information
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-
- Request cross-referral to
- -
- Output has been delayed by COVID-19
- No
- COVID-19 affected output statement
- -
- Forensic science
- No
- Criminology
- No
- Interdisciplinary
- No
- Number of additional authors
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1
- Research group(s)
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-
- Citation count
- 4
- Proposed double-weighted
- No
- Reserve for an output with double weighting
- No
- Additional information
- This paper makes simple, but impactful observations about polynomial-based message authentication codes. The attack technique proposed covers all published attacks against GCM (the world most widely-deployed Authentication Encryption algorithm, and an international standard). It also shows that almost every subset of the GCM keyspace is a weak key class. The strength of the technique is demonstrated by showing an attack GCM/2+, a GCM variant designed to increase the efficiency in software. The paper was invited for publication in the Journal of Cryptology, after receiving best paper award at FSE'13. The FSE'13 version was not submitted to REF 2014.
- Author contribution statement
- -
- Non-English
- No
- English abstract
- -