Arbitration and Stability in Cooperative Games with Overlapping Coalitions.
- Submitting institution
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University of Oxford
- Unit of assessment
- 11 - Computer Science and Informatics
- Output identifier
- 1945
- Type
- D - Journal article
- DOI
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10.1613/jair.4237
- Title of journal
- Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
- Article number
- -
- First page
- 847
- Volume
- 50
- Issue
- -
- ISSN
- 1076-9757
- Open access status
- Out of scope for open access requirements
- Month of publication
- August
- Year of publication
- 2014
- URL
-
-
- Supplementary information
-
-
- Request cross-referral to
- -
- Output has been delayed by COVID-19
- No
- COVID-19 affected output statement
- -
- Forensic science
- No
- Criminology
- No
- Interdisciplinary
- No
- Number of additional authors
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2
- Research group(s)
-
-
- Citation count
- 10
- Proposed double-weighted
- No
- Reserve for an output with double weighting
- No
- Additional information
- This paper introduces a general model for studying stability in cooperative games where a player may simultaneously participate in several coalitions, distributing its resources among the coalitions to which it contributes. It provides a characterisation of stable outcomes, and offers a new perspective on prior work on games with overlapping coalitions. The conference version of this paper received the Best Student Paper award at AAMAS and forms the first half of the PhD thesis of Yair Zick, which received the Victor Lesser Distinguished Dissertation Award (sponsored by International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems).
- Author contribution statement
- -
- Non-English
- No
- English abstract
- -