Approximately Efficient Two-Sided Combinatorial Auctions
- Submitting institution
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King's College London
- Unit of assessment
- 11 - Computer Science and Informatics
- Output identifier
- 128925201
- Type
- D - Journal article
- DOI
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10.1145/3381523
- Title of journal
- ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
- Article number
- 4
- First page
- -
- Volume
- 8
- Issue
- 1
- ISSN
- 2167-8375
- Open access status
- Technical exception
- Month of publication
- March
- Year of publication
- 2020
- URL
-
-
- Supplementary information
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- Request cross-referral to
- -
- Output has been delayed by COVID-19
- No
- COVID-19 affected output statement
- -
- Forensic science
- No
- Criminology
- No
- Interdisciplinary
- No
- Number of additional authors
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5
- Research group(s)
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-
- Citation count
- 0
- Proposed double-weighted
- No
- Reserve for an output with double weighting
- No
- Additional information
- This work presents a collection of double auctions with performance guarantees, and provides the first auction formats that perform provably well in vastly more general settings than previously studied. These settings capture the complexity of many modern two-sided markets in the access economy, such as AirBnB and Uber. The preliminary version was presented at ACM EC 2017. Shortly thereafter, the work spawned numerous further theoretical and experimental studies (e.g., https://doi.org/10.1145/3033274.3085148, https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/11450). This work has been covered in keynote talks at the WINE 2018 conference (https://www.cs.ox.ac.uk/conferences/wine2018/index.html) and the 11th day on Computational Game Theory (https://www.utwente.nl/en/eemcs/dmmp/events/cgtday/).
- Author contribution statement
- -
- Non-English
- No
- English abstract
- -