DEMOS-2 : scalable E2E verifiable elections without random oracles
- Submitting institution
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The University of Lancaster
- Unit of assessment
- 11 - Computer Science and Informatics
- Output identifier
- 156984199
- Type
- E - Conference contribution
- DOI
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10.1145/2810103.2813727
- Title of conference / published proceedings
- CCS '15 Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
- First page
- 352
- Volume
- -
- Issue
- -
- ISSN
- -
- Open access status
- -
- Month of publication
- October
- Year of publication
- 2015
- URL
-
-
- Supplementary information
-
-
- Request cross-referral to
- -
- Output has been delayed by COVID-19
- No
- COVID-19 affected output statement
- -
- Forensic science
- No
- Criminology
- No
- Interdisciplinary
- No
- Number of additional authors
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2
- Research group(s)
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I - Security
- Citation count
- 14
- Proposed double-weighted
- No
- Reserve for an output with double weighting
- No
- Additional information
- End-to-end (E2E) verifiability has been widely identified as a critical property for the adoption of e-voting systems in real-world election procedures. In an E2E verifiable election system, it is possible for an auditor to verify the integrity of the election result utilizing feedback from the participants and examining the public election transcript. Many e-voting systems can achieve E2E verifiability, but most rely on some setup assumptions, such as trusted hardware, random beacon, and/or random oracles. In this work, we propose a scalable e2e voting system without any setup assumption. This is the first scalable e-voting system that achieves this property.
- Author contribution statement
- -
- Non-English
- No
- English abstract
- -
