The Stabilisation of Equilibria in Evolutionary Game Dynamics through Mutation: Mutation Limits in Evolutionary Games
- Submitting institution
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City, University of London
- Unit of assessment
- 11 - Computer Science and Informatics
- Output identifier
- 837
- Type
- D - Journal article
- DOI
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10.1098/rspa.2019.0355
- Title of journal
- Proceedings of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences
- Article number
- 20190355
- First page
- -
- Volume
- 475
- Issue
- 2231
- ISSN
- 1364-5021
- Open access status
- Compliant
- Month of publication
- November
- Year of publication
- 2019
- URL
-
-
- Supplementary information
-
-
- Request cross-referral to
- -
- Output has been delayed by COVID-19
- No
- COVID-19 affected output statement
- -
- Forensic science
- No
- Criminology
- No
- Interdisciplinary
- No
- Number of additional authors
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2
- Research group(s)
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-
- Citation count
- 1
- Proposed double-weighted
- No
- Reserve for an output with double weighting
- No
- Additional information
- In this paper a new notion of equilibria of replicator dynamics (RD), called mutation limits, based on a naturally arising, simple form of mutation, which is invariant under the specific choice of mutation parameters, is introduced and their existence for a large class of games proved. This line of research won the Best Paper Award at the 9th European Conference of Mathematical and Theoretical Biology, Gothenburg June 2014. It was also instrumental in securing the H2020-MSCA-RISE-2015 project FourCmodelling: Conflict, Competition, Cooperation and Complexity: Using Evolutionary Game Theory to model realistic populations (2016-2019).
- Author contribution statement
- -
- Non-English
- No
- English abstract
- -
