Time protection : the missing OS abstraction
- Submitting institution
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The University of Birmingham
- Unit of assessment
- 11 - Computer Science and Informatics
- Output identifier
- 69048297
- Type
- E - Conference contribution
- DOI
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10.1145/3302424.3303976
- Title of conference / published proceedings
- EuroSys '19 : Proceedings of the Fourteenth EuroSys Conference 2019
- First page
- 1
- Volume
- -
- Issue
- -
- ISSN
- -
- Open access status
- -
- Month of publication
- March
- Year of publication
- 2019
- URL
-
-
- Supplementary information
-
-
- Request cross-referral to
- -
- Output has been delayed by COVID-19
- No
- COVID-19 affected output statement
- -
- Forensic science
- No
- Criminology
- No
- Interdisciplinary
- No
- Number of additional authors
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3
- Research group(s)
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-
- Citation count
- 4
- Proposed double-weighted
- No
- Reserve for an output with double weighting
- No
- Additional information
- We argue that operating systems should provide protection against timing channel-based data leaks. We present a novel design and its implementation in the seL4 micro-kernel and carry out a rigorous evaluation that shows it stops timing attacks. This is significant because it provides the first operating system ever to be prove secure against timing-based data leaks. This paper was published at EuroSys (a leading systems conference) where it won the Best Paper Award. Our methods have been taken up by teams at UNSW and University of Melbourne where the Australian Research Council has funded further work based on this paper.
- Author contribution statement
- -
- Non-English
- No
- English abstract
- -