Executive Compensation in Imperfect Financial Markets
- Submitting institution
-
The University of Sheffield
- Unit of assessment
- 18 - Law
- Output identifier
- 6458
- Type
- A - Authored book
- DOI
-
10.4337/9781782549291
- Publisher
- Edward Elgar Publishing
- ISBN
- 9781782549284
- Open access status
- -
- Month of publication
- October
- Year of publication
- 2014
- URL
-
-
- Supplementary information
-
-
- Request cross-referral to
- -
- Output has been delayed by COVID-19
- No
- COVID-19 affected output statement
- -
- Forensic science
- No
- Criminology
- No
- Interdisciplinary
- Yes
- Number of additional authors
-
0
- Research group(s)
-
-
- Proposed double-weighted
- Yes
- Double-weighted statement
- This is an extended piece of work and the product of six years of theoretical and empirical research. It provides the first interdisciplinary analysis of the role of executive compensation incentives at financial institutions in creating the conditions for financial instability. The book engages in an extensive critique of orthodox financial market theory to provide an alternative Minskyan framework through which the financial system may be analysed. Based on this framework, the book offers a unique contribution to the legal literature on the design of legal and regulatory structures which underpin the governance of large financial institutions.
- Reserve for an output with double weighting
- No
- Additional information
- -
- Author contribution statement
- -
- Non-English
- No
- English abstract
- -