The Epistemic Innocence of Irrational Beliefs
- Submitting institution
-
The University of Birmingham
- Unit of assessment
- 30 - Philosophy
- Output identifier
- 91999755
- Type
- A - Authored book
- DOI
-
10.1093/oso/9780198863984.001.0001
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- ISBN
- 9780198863984
- Open access status
- -
- Month of publication
- June
- Year of publication
- 2020
- URL
-
-
- Supplementary information
-
-
- Request cross-referral to
- -
- Output has been delayed by COVID-19
- No
- COVID-19 affected output statement
- -
- Forensic science
- No
- Criminology
- No
- Interdisciplinary
- No
- Number of additional authors
-
0
- Research group(s)
-
-
- Proposed double-weighted
- Yes
- Double-weighted statement
- This is a sole-authored monograph (approx. 70,000 words), arising from six years of externally-funded research. It involved the analysis of a large body of material on several cases of belief (motivated and elaborated delusions, optimistically biased beliefs, confabulated explanations, distorted memories). It offers a genuinely original perspective on such cases, arguing that epistemically irrational beliefs can be epistemically beneficial. It introduces a new notion and accompanying framework, that of epistemic innocence, which required an investigation of considerable depth into the role of psychological factors in belief evaluation.
- Reserve for an output with double weighting
- No
- Additional information
- -
- Author contribution statement
- -
- Non-English
- No
- English abstract
- -
