A Yabloesque paradox in epistemic game theory
- Submitting institution
-
Middlesex University
- Unit of assessment
- 11 - Computer Science and Informatics
- Output identifier
- 808
- Type
- D - Journal article
- DOI
-
10.1007/s11229-016-1231-9
- Title of journal
- Synthese
- Article number
- -
- First page
- 441
- Volume
- 195
- Issue
- 1
- ISSN
- 0039-7857
- Open access status
- Compliant
- Month of publication
- October
- Year of publication
- 2016
- URL
-
http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/28851/
- Supplementary information
-
-
- Request cross-referral to
- -
- Output has been delayed by COVID-19
- No
- COVID-19 affected output statement
- -
- Forensic science
- No
- Criminology
- No
- Interdisciplinary
- No
- Number of additional authors
-
0
- Research group(s)
-
-
- Citation count
- 1
- Proposed double-weighted
- No
- Reserve for an output with double weighting
- No
- Additional information
- The Brandenburger–Keisler paradox is a self-referential paradox in epistemic game theory, which can be viewed as a two-person version of Russell’s Paradox. Yablo’s Paradox, according to its author, is a non-self-referential paradox, which created a significant impact. This paper gives a Yabloesque, non-self-referential paradox for infinitary players within the context of epistemic game theory. The new paradox advances both the Brandenburger–Keisler and Yablo results. Additionally, the paper constructs a paraconsistent model satisfying the paradoxical statement. This paper solves the open question of creating a non-self-referential paradox in epistemic games.
- Author contribution statement
- -
- Non-English
- No
- English abstract
- -