Combinatorial Auctions Without Money
- Submitting institution
-
The University of Liverpool
- Unit of assessment
- 11 - Computer Science and Informatics
- Output identifier
- 12023
- Type
- D - Journal article
- DOI
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10.1007/s00453-015-0105-8
- Title of journal
- Algorithmica
- Article number
- -
- First page
- 756
- Volume
- 77
- Issue
- 3
- ISSN
- 0178-4617
- Open access status
- Out of scope for open access requirements
- Month of publication
- December
- Year of publication
- 2015
- URL
-
-
- Supplementary information
-
-
- Request cross-referral to
- -
- Output has been delayed by COVID-19
- No
- COVID-19 affected output statement
- -
- Forensic science
- No
- Criminology
- No
- Interdisciplinary
- No
- Number of additional authors
-
2
- Research group(s)
-
-
- Citation count
- 3
- Proposed double-weighted
- No
- Reserve for an output with double weighting
- No
- Additional information
- A preliminary version appeared at AAMAS'14. This paper provided the theoretical foundation for the authors to completely characterise the power of verification of truthful greedy mechanisms for combinatorial auctions (JAIR'18, not REF-returned). The paper also inspired new models in pricing cloud storage (Ceppi, Kash, SIGMETRICS-2015) and truthful RAM allocation (Kovacs, Meyer, Ventre, WINE-2015). The results are used and extended by Ceppi, Kash, Frongillo (AAAI'19), who also provide practical tools to check when verification can substitute money.
- Author contribution statement
- -
- Non-English
- No
- English abstract
- -