Duality and optimality of auctions for uniform distributions
- Submitting institution
-
University of Oxford
- Unit of assessment
- 11 - Computer Science and Informatics
- Output identifier
- 2036
- Type
- D - Journal article
- DOI
-
10.1137/16M1072218
- Title of journal
- SIAM Journal on Computing
- Article number
- -
- First page
- 121
- Volume
- 47
- Issue
- 1
- ISSN
- 0097-5397
- Open access status
- Compliant
- Month of publication
- January
- Year of publication
- 2018
- URL
-
-
- Supplementary information
-
-
- Request cross-referral to
- -
- Output has been delayed by COVID-19
- No
- COVID-19 affected output statement
- -
- Forensic science
- No
- Criminology
- No
- Interdisciplinary
- No
- Number of additional authors
-
1
- Research group(s)
-
-
- Citation count
- 0
- Proposed double-weighted
- No
- Reserve for an output with double weighting
- No
- Additional information
- This paper, which extends a conference version at EC�14, solved a long-standing problem in optimal auctions. Since Myerson showed how to design optimal auctions for single-parameter domains in 1981, extending it to multidimensional domains has been a major open problem. This paper gives the first such extension for the uniform distribution for up to dimension 6, a classical problem at the intersection of economics and computing, and the canonical long-standing open problem in the area. It also provides the mathematical framework and the geometric intuition to extend it to higher dimensions, to more players, and to other distributions.
- Author contribution statement
- -
- Non-English
- No
- English abstract
- -