CHERI JNI: Sinking the Java Security Model into the C
- Submitting institution
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University of Cambridge
- Unit of assessment
- 11 - Computer Science and Informatics
- Output identifier
- 1863
- Type
- E - Conference contribution
- DOI
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10.1145/3037697.3037725
- Title of conference / published proceedings
- OPERATING SYSTEMS REVIEW
- First page
- 569
- Volume
- 51
- Issue
- 2
- ISSN
- 0163-5980
- Open access status
- Compliant
- Month of publication
- June
- Year of publication
- 2017
- URL
-
-
- Supplementary information
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- Request cross-referral to
- -
- Output has been delayed by COVID-19
- No
- COVID-19 affected output statement
- -
- Forensic science
- No
- Criminology
- No
- Interdisciplinary
- No
- Number of additional authors
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14
- Research group(s)
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-
- Citation count
- 1
- Proposed double-weighted
- No
- Reserve for an output with double weighting
- No
- Additional information
- CHERI JNI uses fine-grained memory protection to compartmentalise C-code linked against Java code using the Java Native Interface. Without this mechanism, exploits in the C-code break the Java security model. This concept is transferrable to other safe programming languages that are often linked against libraries and run-times written in unsafe languages. This work contributed to the broader CHERI programme resulting in further grants (ECATS, SafeBet, IOSec, CAPcellerate, ChaOS) and establishment of the Digital Security by Design (DSbD) Industrial Strategy Challenge Fund: GBP70m from InnovateUK and GBP117m from industry, including Arm's industrial demonstrator of CHERI: Morello due late 2021.
- Author contribution statement
- -
- Non-English
- No
- English abstract
- -