Size versus truthfulness in the House Allocation problem
- Submitting institution
-
University of Glasgow
- Unit of assessment
- 11 - Computer Science and Informatics
- Output identifier
- 11-12008
- Type
- D - Journal article
- DOI
-
10.1007/s00453-019-00584-7
- Title of journal
- Algorithmica
- Article number
- -
- First page
- 3422
- Volume
- 81
- Issue
- 9
- ISSN
- 0178-4617
- Open access status
- Compliant
- Month of publication
- September
- Year of publication
- 2019
- URL
-
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/186038/
- Supplementary information
-
-
- Request cross-referral to
- -
- Output has been delayed by COVID-19
- No
- COVID-19 affected output statement
- -
- Forensic science
- No
- Criminology
- No
- Interdisciplinary
- No
- Number of additional authors
-
3
- Research group(s)
-
-
- Citation count
- 0
- Proposed double-weighted
- No
- Reserve for an output with double weighting
- No
- Additional information
- ORIGINALITY: Presents the first explicit exposition of the classical Random Serial Dictatorship Mechanism for the House Allocation problem (HA) where preference lists may contain ties, showing that it is truthful, producing a Pareto optimal matching. SIGNIFICANCE: HA has applications in assigning pupils to schools, where truthful mechanisms are of paramount importance and Pareto optimal matchings are a fundamental solution concept. RIGOUR: All results are proved mathematically. Algorithmica is a top-ranked journal. An earlier version appeared at ACM Economics and Computation, the top conference at the intersection of computer science and economics. Acceptance rate: 28% (80 / 290 submissions). Highly-cited paper.
- Author contribution statement
- -
- Non-English
- No
- English abstract
- -