Efficiency and complexity of price competition among single-product vendors
- Submitting institution
-
The University of Essex
- Unit of assessment
- 11 - Computer Science and Informatics
- Output identifier
- 1366
- Type
- D - Journal article
- DOI
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10.1016/j.artint.2017.03.001
- Title of journal
- Artificial Intelligence
- Article number
- -
- First page
- 9
- Volume
- 248
- Issue
- -
- ISSN
- 0004-3702
- Open access status
- Deposit exception
- Month of publication
- March
- Year of publication
- 2017
- URL
-
-
- Supplementary information
-
-
- Request cross-referral to
- -
- Output has been delayed by COVID-19
- No
- COVID-19 affected output statement
- -
- Forensic science
- No
- Criminology
- No
- Interdisciplinary
- No
- Number of additional authors
-
5
- Research group(s)
-
A - Artificial Intelligence (AI)
- Citation count
- 5
- Proposed double-weighted
- No
- Reserve for an output with double weighting
- No
- Additional information
- This was the first paper to model and study in a rigorous manner the existence, efficiency, and computational complexity of stable states in the two-stage full-information pricing game played between buyers and vendors in markets. Significantly, it was also the first to study and quantify the impact of using subsidies in such scenarios. Published in the internationally-accepted premier international forum in the field, the paper contributed to a wider portfolio of themed work and extends and generalises in a non-trivial manner preliminary results in the highly-competitive flagship conference IJCAI15. The paper provides rigorous mathematical proofs for the vendor-buyers pricing game.
- Author contribution statement
- -
- Non-English
- No
- English abstract
- -