Corruption, trade costs, and gains from tariff liberalization: evidence from Southern Africa
- Submitting institution
-
The London School of Economics and Political Science
: B - 22B: International Development
- Unit of assessment
- 22 - Anthropology and Development Studies : B - 22B: International Development
- Output identifier
- 15888848
- Type
- D - Journal article
- DOI
-
10.1257/aer.20150313
- Title of journal
- American Economic Review
- Article number
- -
- First page
- 3029
- Volume
- 106
- Issue
- 10
- ISSN
- 0002-8282
- Open access status
- Compliant
- Month of publication
- October
- Year of publication
- 2016
- URL
-
-
- Supplementary information
-
-
- Request cross-referral to
- 16 - Economics and Econometrics
- Output has been delayed by COVID-19
- No
- COVID-19 affected output statement
- -
- Forensic science
- No
- Criminology
- No
- Interdisciplinary
- No
- Number of additional authors
-
0
- Research group(s)
-
-
- Proposed double-weighted
- No
- Reserve for an output with double weighting
- No
- Additional information
- Different from the 2014 working paper in:
a) The research question: the older paper is about displacement in corruption (from collusive to coercive) when there is a tariff change, the most recent paper leverages a tariff change to estimate trade elasticities;
b) Approach and methodology: the old paper models collusive vs coercive corruption and tries to estimate how a tariff change affects both of these margins while the more recent one relies triangulates between official trade data (COMTRADE), firm data and corruption data to show that low price elasticities might be driven by pervasive corruption during periods of high tariffs.
- Author contribution statement
- -
- Non-English
- No
- English abstract
- -