Combinatorial Auctions Without Money
- Submitting institution
-
Teesside University
- Unit of assessment
- 12 - Engineering
- Output identifier
- 4033285
- Type
- D - Journal article
- DOI
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10.1007/s00453-015-0105-8
- Title of journal
- Algorithmica
- Article number
- -
- First page
- 756
- Volume
- 77
- Issue
- 3
- ISSN
- 0178-4617
- Open access status
- Out of scope for open access requirements
- Month of publication
- December
- Year of publication
- 2015
- URL
-
-
- Supplementary information
-
-
- Request cross-referral to
- -
- Output has been delayed by COVID-19
- No
- COVID-19 affected output statement
- -
- Forensic science
- No
- Criminology
- No
- Interdisciplinary
- No
- Number of additional authors
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2
- Research group(s)
-
-
- Proposed double-weighted
- No
- Reserve for an output with double weighting
- No
- Additional information
- This work, which represents the main thrust behind the EPSRC grant EP/M018113, initiated the investigation of the middle ground between incentive-compatibility, approximation and the use of monetary transfers. The idea is to adopt a well-motivated mechanism design paradigm to formally characterise truthful combinatorial auctions that do not charge bidders. Follow-up work includes an experimental study showing that these auctions can maximise the UK charity sector income from goods donated by the public (AAMAS’19, pp. 1910–1912) and a study to relate truthfulness with and without money (AAAI’19 pp. 1837-1844). The preliminary version of this paper appeared at AAMAS’14.
- Author contribution statement
- -
- Non-English
- No
- English abstract
- -