Bounding the inefficiency of outcomes in generalized second price auctions
- Submitting institution
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The University of Essex
- Unit of assessment
- 11 - Computer Science and Informatics
- Output identifier
- 1179
- Type
- D - Journal article
- DOI
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10.1016/j.jet.2014.04.010
- Title of journal
- Journal of Economic Theory
- Article number
- -
- First page
- 343
- Volume
- 156
- Issue
- -
- ISSN
- 0022-0531
- Open access status
- Out of scope for open access requirements
- Month of publication
- April
- Year of publication
- 2014
- URL
-
-
- Supplementary information
-
-
- Request cross-referral to
- -
- Output has been delayed by COVID-19
- No
- COVID-19 affected output statement
- -
- Forensic science
- No
- Criminology
- No
- Interdisciplinary
- Yes
- Number of additional authors
-
6
- Research group(s)
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A - Artificial Intelligence (AI)
- Citation count
- 22
- Proposed double-weighted
- No
- Reserve for an output with double weighting
- No
- Additional information
- This well-cited work (preliminary versions appeared in FOCS'10/EC'11, both leading conferences) provides a first formal and rigorous justification for the prevalence of the Generalized Second Price auction in sponsored search auctions, by quantifying the efficiency loss that can arise when the system reaches any stable state under a wide range of sources of uncertainty. The analysis is highly non-trivial and proves that the efficiency of GSP is very robust with respect to numerous assumptions. JET is among the top journals in the area, and the paper was an invited contribution to the special issue on Computer Science and Economic Theory.
- Author contribution statement
- -
- Non-English
- No
- English abstract
- -