'Aristotle and the Cognitive Component of Emotions'
- Submitting institution
-
University of Bristol
- Unit of assessment
- 30 - Philosophy
- Output identifier
- 94042296
- Type
- D - Journal article
- DOI
-
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712923.003.0005
- Title of journal
- Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy
- Article number
- -
- First page
- 165
- Volume
- 46
- Issue
- 0
- ISSN
- 0265-7651
- Open access status
- Out of scope for open access requirements
- Month of publication
- June
- Year of publication
- 2014
- URL
-
-
- Supplementary information
-
-
- Request cross-referral to
- -
- Output has been delayed by COVID-19
- No
- COVID-19 affected output statement
- -
- Forensic science
- No
- Criminology
- No
- Interdisciplinary
- No
- Number of additional authors
-
0
- Research group(s)
-
-
- Proposed double-weighted
- Yes
- Double-weighted statement
- This is a major study (47 pages) of Aristotle’s account of emotions, the culmination of many years work by the author on Aristotle’s philosophical psychology. It finds a fundamental, but unwarranted, assumption in studies on Aristotle (one replicated in many contemporary philosophical accounts of emotions), namely that emotions must essentially involve either perceptual states or beliefs. It argues that the choice is illusory, and that Aristotle holds that emotions can involve a number of different intentional states. The philosophical advantages of this view are emphasised and then explored in relation to recalcitrant emotions and our emotional responses to fiction.
- Reserve for an output with double weighting
- No
- Additional information
- -
- Author contribution statement
- -
- Non-English
- No
- English abstract
- -
