Approximately Efficient Double Auctions with Strong Budget Balance
- Submitting institution
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King's College London
- Unit of assessment
- 11 - Computer Science and Informatics
- Output identifier
- 127952632
- Type
- E - Conference contribution
- DOI
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10.1137/1.9781611974331.ch98
- Title of conference / published proceedings
- SODA '16: Proceedings of the twenty-seventh annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
- First page
- 1424
- Volume
- Jan
- Issue
- -
- ISSN
- -
- Open access status
- -
- Month of publication
- January
- Year of publication
- 2016
- URL
-
-
- Supplementary information
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-
- Request cross-referral to
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- Output has been delayed by COVID-19
- No
- COVID-19 affected output statement
- -
- Forensic science
- No
- Criminology
- No
- Interdisciplinary
- No
- Number of additional authors
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3
- Research group(s)
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-
- Citation count
- -
- Proposed double-weighted
- No
- Reserve for an output with double weighting
- No
- Additional information
- This is the first paper to successfully design feasible and near-optimal mechanisms for the fundamental double auction setting (i.e. where buyers and sellers trade with each other). The paper’s mechanisms ensure that the worst-case social welfare approximates the theoretically optimal social welfare of the market, irrespective of size and structure. Furthermore, no money is lost nor injected into the market. This work has attracted attention from economists and computer scientists: further interdisciplinary investigations on two-sided auctions, both experimental and theoretical, quickly followed the publication of this paper, see e.g. Brustle et al. [EC2017]
- Author contribution statement
- -
- Non-English
- No
- English abstract
- -