Bounds on the Cost of Stabilizing a Cooperative Game
- Submitting institution
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King's College London
- Unit of assessment
- 11 - Computer Science and Informatics
- Output identifier
- 136476455
- Type
- D - Journal article
- DOI
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10.1613/jair.1.11270
- Title of journal
- Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
- Article number
- -
- First page
- 987
- Volume
- 63
- Issue
- 3
- ISSN
- 1076-9757
- Open access status
- Compliant
- Month of publication
- December
- Year of publication
- 2018
- URL
-
-
- Supplementary information
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- Request cross-referral to
- -
- Output has been delayed by COVID-19
- No
- COVID-19 affected output statement
- -
- Forensic science
- No
- Criminology
- No
- Interdisciplinary
- No
- Number of additional authors
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7
- Research group(s)
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-
- Citation count
- 1
- Proposed double-weighted
- No
- Reserve for an output with double weighting
- No
- Additional information
- Coalitional games are an economic framework that has been adopted to model agents’ interactions in multi-agent systems. This work introduces the cost of stability in coalitional games, which is the subsidy that an external authority would be willing to pay to stabilize an unstable game and support agent collaboration. Preliminary versions of this work appeared in AAMAS2009 and IJCAI2011. The novel concept defined spurred a stream of works investigating the cost of stability in various game settings and other concepts that can be related to the cost of stability, see e.g., https://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/AAAI/AAAI13/paper/view/6335; http://www.ifaamas.org/Proceedings/aamas2013/docs/p183.pdf; https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/2764468.2764477; http://www.ifaamas.org/Proceedings/aamas2020/pdfs/p393.pdf;
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_25; http://www.ifaamas.org/Proceedings/aamas2014/aamas/p589.pdf.
- Author contribution statement
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- Non-English
- No
- English abstract
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