A Formal Approach to Physics-Based Attacks in Cyber-Physical Systems
- Submitting institution
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King's College London
- Unit of assessment
- 11 - Computer Science and Informatics
- Output identifier
- 120193653
- Type
- D - Journal article
- DOI
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10.1145/3373270
- Title of journal
- ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security
- Article number
- 3
- First page
- 3:1
- Volume
- 23
- Issue
- 1
- ISSN
- 2471-2566
- Open access status
- Compliant
- Month of publication
- February
- Year of publication
- 2020
- URL
-
-
- Supplementary information
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-
- Request cross-referral to
- -
- Output has been delayed by COVID-19
- No
- COVID-19 affected output statement
- -
- Forensic science
- Yes
- Criminology
- No
- Interdisciplinary
- No
- Number of additional authors
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3
- Research group(s)
-
-
- Citation count
- 1
- Proposed double-weighted
- No
- Reserve for an output with double weighting
- No
- Additional information
- The number and severity of attacks to cyber-physical systems (CPSs), bringing them into states dangerous for systems and humans keep increasing dramatically. Consequences at the physical level put CPS-security apart from standard information-security, exposing a gap between physical-level security and communication-level security which cannot be closed by combining existing solutions. This paper bridges this gap by laying novel and formal foundations for automated reasoning about CPS-security both at physical and communication level, allowing discovery of novel attacks. This research, which started with [Lanotte, Merro, Muradore, Viganò CSF2017] spawned a keynote-talk at FCS-2018 and follow-up papers, including [Lanotte et al. CSF2020].
- Author contribution statement
- -
- Non-English
- No
- English abstract
- -