Du-Vote: Remote Electronic Voting with Untrusted Computers
- Submitting institution
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The University of Birmingham
- Unit of assessment
- 11 - Computer Science and Informatics
- Output identifier
- 53947646
- Type
- E - Conference contribution
- DOI
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10.1109/CSF.2015.18
- Title of conference / published proceedings
- 2015 IEEE 28th Computer Security Foundations Symposium
- First page
- 155
- Volume
- -
- Issue
- -
- ISSN
- -
- Open access status
- -
- Month of publication
- September
- Year of publication
- 2015
- URL
-
-
- Supplementary information
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-
- Request cross-referral to
- -
- Output has been delayed by COVID-19
- No
- COVID-19 affected output statement
- -
- Forensic science
- No
- Criminology
- No
- Interdisciplinary
- No
- Number of additional authors
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3
- Research group(s)
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-
- Citation count
- 13
- Proposed double-weighted
- No
- Reserve for an output with double weighting
- No
- Additional information
- The central obstacle to electronic voting is the potential untrustworthiness of the computers used to collect and process the votes. The paper proposes a system in which all platforms (both client- and server-side) may be potentially controlled by an adversary, and yet we still achieve voter-verifiable probabilistic guarantees of integrity of the election outcome. This is significant because it paves the way for ensuring observability of malicious interference in elections. The paper contains proofs of its security properties. It achieved much technology press coverage because it seems to achieve something that intuition suggests ought to be impossible.
- Author contribution statement
- -
- Non-English
- No
- English abstract
- -