A Formal Treatment of Accountable Proxying Over TLS
- Submitting institution
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The University of Surrey
- Unit of assessment
- 11 - Computer Science and Informatics
- Output identifier
- 9023839_1
- Type
- E - Conference contribution
- DOI
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10.1109/SP.2018.00021
- Title of conference / published proceedings
- 2018 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
- First page
- 0
- Volume
- 0
- Issue
- 0
- ISSN
- 2375-1207
- Open access status
- Deposit exception
- Month of publication
- -
- Year of publication
- 2018
- URL
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- Supplementary information
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- Request cross-referral to
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- Output has been delayed by COVID-19
- No
- COVID-19 affected output statement
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- Forensic science
- No
- Criminology
- No
- Interdisciplinary
- No
- Number of additional authors
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- Research group(s)
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- Citation count
- 2
- Proposed double-weighted
- No
- Reserve for an output with double weighting
- No
- Additional information
- Middlebox-security (e.g., stemming from entrusting proxies with server/client secure content) is a prominent topic for standardisation-bodies (ETSI and IETF) and Internet-giants like Akamai and Cloudflare. Herein, we advanced the first cryptographic treatment of access-controlled middlebox-security, in a generic solution, i.e., applicable to all realistic channelling-securing protocols.
Since, with Ericsson, Verizon and Orange, we implemented and tested “in the wild” a TLS1.2-based incarnation of this (published it at TrustCom2020). With Ericsson, Cloudflare and Concordia University, we are now evaluating a TLS1.3-based version of our solution. All of this, and our prior work at EuroSP2017, are the subject of ongoing IETF standardisations.
- Author contribution statement
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- Non-English
- No
- English abstract
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