Computing Nash Equilibria and Evolutionarily Stable States of Evolutionary Games
- Submitting institution
-
University of Nottingham, The
- Unit of assessment
- 11 - Computer Science and Informatics
- Output identifier
- 1319177
- Type
- D - Journal article
- DOI
-
10.1109/TEVC.2015.2490076
- Title of journal
- IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation
- Article number
- -
- First page
- 460
- Volume
- 20
- Issue
- 3
- ISSN
- 1089-778X
- Open access status
- Out of scope for open access requirements
- Month of publication
- October
- Year of publication
- 2015
- URL
-
-
- Supplementary information
-
-
- Request cross-referral to
- -
- Output has been delayed by COVID-19
- No
- COVID-19 affected output statement
- -
- Forensic science
- No
- Criminology
- No
- Interdisciplinary
- No
- Number of additional authors
-
2
- Research group(s)
-
-
- Citation count
- 13
- Proposed double-weighted
- No
- Reserve for an output with double weighting
- No
- Additional information
- Evolutionary game theory is of interest to many disciplines. The traditional mathematical theory of games, combined with evolution's survival of the fittest principle, can be used to explain the complex behaviour of populations in a range of biological and social systems. Nash Equilibria (NE) is closely related to evolutionary stability and determines the resilience of population to disturbances. Computing NE is computationally hard and this paper develops tractable and general algorithms for NE on repeated games and evolutionary games. It also develops a new stability analysis based on a subset of NE, based on the new concept of level-k equilibrium.
- Author contribution statement
- -
- Non-English
- No
- English abstract
- -
