Every Vote Counts: Ensuring Integrity in Large-Scale Electronic Voting
- Submitting institution
-
University of Newcastle upon Tyne
- Unit of assessment
- 11 - Computer Science and Informatics
- Output identifier
- 208608-70826-1292
- Type
- D - Journal article
- DOI
-
-
- Title of journal
- USENIX Journal of Election Technology and Systems (JETS)
- Article number
- -
- First page
- 1
- Volume
- 2
- Issue
- 3
- ISSN
- 2328-2797
- Open access status
- Compliant
- Month of publication
- July
- Year of publication
- 2014
- URL
-
https://www.usenix.org/jets/issues/0203/hao
- Supplementary information
-
-
- Request cross-referral to
- -
- Output has been delayed by COVID-19
- No
- COVID-19 affected output statement
- -
- Forensic science
- No
- Criminology
- No
- Interdisciplinary
- No
- Number of additional authors
-
5
- Research group(s)
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E - Secure and Resilient Systems
- Citation count
- -
- Proposed double-weighted
- No
- Reserve for an output with double weighting
- No
- Additional information
- Numerous End-to-End (E2E) verifiable electronic voting systems exist, and have shown that trustworthy voting can be achieved, without needing to trust any of the hardware or software employed. But almost all rely on the availability during elections of cryptography experts acting as Tallying Authorities (TAs) supervising the final vote-tallying. In contrast, our Direct Recording Electronic with Integrity (DRE-i) scheme is notable for completely avoiding the need for TAs. This paper provides a full analysis of the security, efficiency, usability and dependability of DRE-i, its practicality even for large-scale elections, and its resulting advantages over other leading electronic voting systems.
- Author contribution statement
- -
- Non-English
- No
- English abstract
- -