Counting Keys in Parallel After a Side Channel Attack
- Submitting institution
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University of Bristol
- Unit of assessment
- 11 - Computer Science and Informatics
- Output identifier
- 94287134
- Type
- E - Conference contribution
- DOI
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10.1007/978-3-662-48800-3_13
- Title of conference / published proceedings
- Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT 2015 : 21st International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, Auckland, New Zealand, November 29 -- December 3, 2015, Proceedings, Part II
- First page
- 313
- Volume
- -
- Issue
- -
- ISSN
- -
- Open access status
- -
- Month of publication
- December
- Year of publication
- 2015
- URL
-
-
- Supplementary information
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-
- Request cross-referral to
- -
- Output has been delayed by COVID-19
- No
- COVID-19 affected output statement
- -
- Forensic science
- No
- Criminology
- No
- Interdisciplinary
- No
- Number of additional authors
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3
- Research group(s)
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B - Cybersecurity and Cryptography
- Citation count
- 21
- Proposed double-weighted
- No
- Reserve for an output with double weighting
- No
- Additional information
- Much academic work on side-channel attacks assumes that one captures enough side channel information to isolate only a single potential key. In practice this is not how attacks work. An attack captures information, which leads to the attacker updating their probability distribution on the expected key. This paper was the first to demonstrate that this practical methodology is more effective, giving a key enumeration algorithm (in which keys are enumerated according to their expected probability). It was the first to utilize High Performance Computing capabilities to perform attacks in practice.
- Author contribution statement
- -
- Non-English
- No
- English abstract
- -