Tight Bounds for the Price of Anarchy of Simultaneous First Price Auctions.
- Submitting institution
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The University of Liverpool
- Unit of assessment
- 11 - Computer Science and Informatics
- Output identifier
- 12002
- Type
- D - Journal article
- DOI
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10.1145/2847520
- Title of journal
- ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
- Article number
- 9
- First page
- 1
- Volume
- 4
- Issue
- 2
- ISSN
- 2167-8375
- Open access status
- Out of scope for open access requirements
- Month of publication
- February
- Year of publication
- 2016
- URL
-
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- Supplementary information
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-
- Request cross-referral to
- -
- Output has been delayed by COVID-19
- No
- COVID-19 affected output statement
- -
- Forensic science
- No
- Criminology
- No
- Interdisciplinary
- No
- Number of additional authors
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3
- Research group(s)
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-
- Citation count
- -
- Proposed double-weighted
- No
- Reserve for an output with double weighting
- No
- Additional information
- As stated and discussed in the survey of Roughgarden, Syrgkanis, and Tardos (JAIR 2017), the results in this paper are the state of the art for bounding the Price of Anarchy in first-price item-bidding auctions. This paper was part of Sgouritsa's thesis, which was runner up for the 2018 BCS Distinguished Dissertation Award.
- Author contribution statement
- -
- Non-English
- No
- English abstract
- -